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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
The dissertation consists of three chapters spanning two areas of finance: corporate 
finance and institutional investors. In the first chapter, “Board Gender Diversity, Firm 
Culture, and Female Inventors”, I study how employee's Research and Development 
(R&D) activity is affected by firm culture. Using board gender diversity as a proxy for 
female-friendly culture, I find that a greater representation of women in the boardroom 
is associated with increased productivity and innovation output by female inventors 
relative to male inventors. Female inventors file more highly cited patents and less 
uncited patents. The effect is driven by female directors with R&D or high-tech 
expertise. The results support the notion that women in leadership positions cultivate a 
more female-friendly firm culture. In the second chapter, “Mutual Fund Preference for 
Pure-Play Firms” coauthored with Bradford Jordan and Mark Liu, we examine how a 
firm’s organization form affects mutual fund investments. We show that actively 
managed mutual funds avoid diluting their industry expertise by holding more pure-
play firms. Specifically, mutual funds prefer firms that operate in fewer industries and 
firms with higher industry beta; this preference is stronger among mutual funds with 
greater industry expertise. We propose a measure, Pureplayness, as the fraction of a 
fund's equity invested in pure-play firms. Our results suggest that funds with higher 
Pureplayness have better risk-adjusted performance. In the third chapter, “Can Mergers 
and Acquisitions Internalize Positive Externalities in Funding Innovation” coauthored 
with Thomas Chemmanur and Mark Liu, we find that mergers and acquisitions between 
innovation users and innovation producers enhance innovation output. The combined 
firm can share the upfront costs and better appropriate the benefits associated with the 
innovation. 
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Chapter 1 Board Gender Diversity, Firm Culture, and Female Inventors 
 
1.1 Introduction 
From 1996 to 2007, women occupied 9% of corporate board seats, and 9% of inventors 
filed patents. 1  Academics, media, and policymakers have widely discussed the 
underrepresentation of women in management positions. European countries and the 
state of California have adopted binding quotas to promote board gender diversity. 
Female directors can cultivate female-friendly firm culture (Matsa and Miller, 2011; 
Tate and Yang, 2015), and a good firm culture enhances employee satisfaction and firm 
values (Edmans, 2011; Bargeron, Lehn, and Smith, 2015). In contrast, fewer papers 
studied the underrepresentation of women in Research and Development (R&D) 
activity. This paper asks whether female directors, associated with female-friendly 
culture, improve the output and productivity of female inventors in innovative firms. 
Using 7,500 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007, I show a positive and significant 
association between the fraction of female directors and the innovation output by 
female inventors2. Female inventors’ productivity, as measured by output per person, is 
also higher in firms with a higher fraction of female directors. The paper focuses on 
innovation because it is a major driving force of economic growth (e.g., Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Kogan et al., 2017). It is important to understand what fosters innovation 
at the individual level. Innovation output, as measured by the number of patents and the 
number of citations, is also a clean measure of employees’ output and productivity.  
The higher innovation output by females is driven by female-friendly culture and the 
“women helping women” channel. The focus on female-friendly firm culture stems 
 
1 Following previous literature on innovation, I define an inventor as an individual who holds 
a patent (Bell, et al., 2018; Brav, et al., 2018). 
2 This finding is consistent with previous literature that board diversity leads to higher firm-
level innovation output (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker, 2018; Chen, Leung, and Evans, 2018; 
Mayer, Warr, and Zhao, 2018; Griffin, Li, and Xu, 2019). The literature explains that female 
directors are better monitors and board diversity leads to robust firm policies and long-term 
focus. This paper offers an additional explanation. 
2 
 
from economics and social psychology studies. Literature shows that women at top 
management levels redirect firm culture, promote family-friendly policies such as 
onsite childcare centers, and improve the productivity of existing female employees. A 
greater representation of women in leadership roles also sends positive signals to 
women seeking senior positions, increased their likelihood of applying for the jobs, and 
has a positive effect on female workers’ career outcomes (Matsa and Miller, 2011; 
Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Tate and Yang, 2015).3 In addition, women in 
female-friendly firms may face less discrimination within firms and face fewer hurdles 
in patenting (Ding, Murray, and Stuart, 2006; Jensen, Kovács, and Sorenson, 2018).  
To identify this channel, I show that the effect of female directors is more significant 
on female inventors than male inventors in the same firm. I control for firm fixed effects 
to mitigate the concern that the results are driven by time-invariant firm characteristics, 
such as products marketed to women by a firm. 
Firms promoting gender equity may affect the quality of innovation output in either 
direction. A diversified board is less tolerating of managers’ poor performance; 
therefore, managers tend to pursue less explorative projects that generate uncertain 
outcomes (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Manso, 2011). It is also easier to increase the 
quantity relative to the quality of innovation output. Therefore, female inventors may 
file more patents with the same quality or even worse quality in female-friendly firms. 
Alternatively, a diversified board can provide a broader range of opinions and expertise 
to help the firm conduct more original and explorative research. Female-friendly firms 
may also be more tolerant of female employees regarding failed projects. Female 
inventors can then pursue riskier research projects that generate more influential 
inventions, and it is discouraged in female-unfriendly firms with less tolerance for 
failure. To test the effect of the diversified board on the quality of innovation output, I 
follow Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso (2017) to examine the distribution of citations. 
 
3 A competing theory is the “queen bee” syndrome that incompatibility exists among female 
workers. If women are used as tokens, and only one woman is “allowed” to ascend to the senior 
ranks, women will view other women more critically (Staines, Tavris, and Jayaratne, 1974). 
This does not apply to my paper because directors and regular employees are not in direct 
competition, which makes the “queen bee” syndrome less of a concern.  
3 
 
I find that in firms with a higher fraction of female directors, female inventors file more 
patents in the right tail of the distribution (receive more citations) and less in the left 
tail of the distribution (receive no citations).4  
The OLS results do not imply causation due to the endogenous nature of corporate 
boards. Firms spend a long time choosing directors that are experienced, skillful, and 
complement targeted board structure (Davis, Yoo, and Baker. 2003; Nguyen and 
Nielsen, 2011). The demand for female directors is affected by unobservable omitted 
variables, such as implicit bias regarding gender (Giannetti and Wang, 2019). Therefore, 
firms with unobservable incentives to promote a gender diversity policy may appoint 
female directors as a first step. Additionally, female directors are scarce human capital, 
and thus they can pick the best-suited firm to serve as a director. This matching process 
leads to a very close association between female directors and firms’ pro-gender policy. 
The OLS results imply that a higher fraction of female directors on the board is 
associated with better performance of female inventors. 
To better understand the cause of female directors’ impact on female inventors, I 
explore the heterogeneity of directors. Compared to inside directors and affiliated 
directors, independent directors have the responsibility to monitor and advise firm 
management.5 Directors hold multiple board positions to gain experience, increase 
exposure, and advance their careers (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; He and Huang, 
2011). Therefore, independent directors have the incentive and ability to impact firm 
policy. I find evidence that a higher fraction of female independent directors correlates 
with more innovation output by female inventors. Next, I show that female independent 
directors with R&D and high-tech expertise have a larger impact on female inventors, 
 
4 Previous literature uses various measures of innovation output. Besides number of patents, 
number of citations is used to represent the importance and value of patents (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2005). Bena and Li (2014) adjust for heterogeneity of technology classes and 
create a measure of patent index. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) measure originality and 
generality of patents based on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s classification of 
technologies. These measures serve as a proxy for the average innovation output. The 
distribution of patents offers a better understanding of the effect of interest. 
5 Inside directors are defined by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) as directors that are 
employees, highly paid, or beneficial owners of the company. The majority of affiliated 
directors are former CEO, non-CEO executives, family members, and directors that are linked 
to the firm through other relationships. 
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compared to directors without R&D expertise. The effect is significant after controlling 
for industry fixed effects. This finding suggests a link between female directors and 
female inventors. Lastly, if female directors are merely a signal of female-friendly 
culture, the effect on female inventors should be significant with just one female 
director on board. I find that it is not the case. Female inventors produce more patents 
in firms with two or more female directors. It suggests that female directors influence 
firm management after reaching a critical mass (Schwartz-Ziv, 2017).  
Next, I test whether female directors proactively cultivate female-friendly firm culture 
through the “women helping women” channel and enhance the output of female 
inventors. Directors have been shown to reshape CEO compensation, investments, and 
redirect firm culture (Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2009; Matsa and Miller, 2011; Tate and Yang, 2015). To examine the causal effect, I 
use instrumental variable estimation by exploiting the role of social connection in 
supplying female directors to firms. Adams and Ferreira (2009) propose that the 
fraction of male directors with board connections to female directors in other firms is a 
valid instrumental variable for board gender diversity. The ratio of female directors is 
under 10% in my sample, indicating a limited supply of female directors. Holding the 
demand constant, more connections to female directors relieves the supply constraint, 
and firms are more likely to have female directors on board. However, one should be 
cautious when interpreting the results. As discussed by Jiang (2017), IV regressions 
estimate local average treatment effects (LATE), where firms choose to hire a female 
director only when the benefits of diversity outweigh its costs. The positive impact of 
gender diversified board does not apply to all firms and does not suggest the imposition 
of diversity rules on all firms. I discuss in detail the economic logic and limitations of 
this instrumental variable in section 1.3. 
The positive impact of female directors on female inventors predicts that the stock 
market should react positively to female director appointments. If female directors help 
female inventors more than male inventors, the market reaction should be stronger 
when female inventors are more critical. I measure the importance of female inventors 
of each industry by the share of patents that have at least one female inventor. I find 
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that in industries where female inventors are more important, firms have significant 
positive announcement abnormal returns around new female director appointments. In 
industries where female inventors are less important, firms have insignificant negative 
abnormal returns. The evidence is consistent with the result that gender diversity creates 
value for the firm.  
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. Studies show that corporate 
culture affects firm value (Edmans, 2011; Bargeron, Lehn, and Smith, 2015), and 
managers shape firm culture (Tate and Yang, 2015). I find consistent evidence that 
female-friendly culture is associated with more productive female inventors. This paper 
also contributes to the literature on the board of directors. Independent directors and 
female directors affect firms in various meaningful ways (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Matsa and Miller, 2011; Levi, Li and Zhang, 2013; Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2017; 
Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker, 2018). I provide evidence to support the “women 
helping women” channel. Lastly, this paper is related to the literature on corporate 
innovation. Innovation is a major driving force of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt, 
1992). Earlier studies found that innovation is affected by IPO activity, hedge fund 
activism, governance, and employee treatment. (Bernstein, 2015; Chen, et al., 2016; 
Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso, 2017; Brav, et al., 2018). This paper confirms the 
corporate culture’s impact on innovation.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Data and sample construction are 
described in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 reports the cross-sectional, within firm, and within 
inventor results, and discusses the heterogeneity of directors and the instrumental 
variable estimation. Section 1.4 concludes the chapter. 
1.2 Data and Sample Construction 
1.2.1 Sample Selection 
The sample construction begins with all firms covered by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services Directors database (ISS; formerly RiskMetrics). ISS provides firm-director-
year level data for all S&P 1500 firms since 1996. The data include directors’ gender, 
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classification (inside, affiliated, or independent), employment title (CEO, CFO, 
chairman, etc.), and employment category (executives, retired employees, consultants, 
etc.). The firm and director identifiers are inconsistent in the dataset, so I follow Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2014) to create unique director identifiers. 6  I exclude 
observations where firms report segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999) or 
utility sector (SIC 4900-4999) because of they face different regulations. The director 
dataset is then merged with Compustat to obtain the firm characteristics. 
The innovation output dataset of patents and citations is constructed by NBER (Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) and extended by Kogan et al. (2017). The dataset includes 
the entire history of US patent documents from Google Patents. The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) allows only individuals to be the inventor, but 
an individual can assign granted patent to another person or a corporation. Therefore, 
patents always have an inventor, and sometimes they have been assigned to one or more 
corporations. Kogan et al. then matched the corporation names to firms in the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock return database. Relative to the NBER 
patent project, this dataset provides 1.9 million patents that can be matched to 
companies, 27 percent of which are not included in the NBER data.  The dataset 
covers patents granted from 1926 to 2010 that are assigned to firms in the CRSP 
database. It also keeps track of all citations for patents granted from 1976 to 2010.7 
The processing time of a patent is usually a few years between the filing date and the 
granting date. Many patents that were filed after 2007 were not granted in 2010, and 
thus they are not included in the dataset. For example, the number of patents in 2008 is 
10% of that in 2007. To avoid bias caused by the variation of processing time of 
 
6 ISS provides two datasets before and after 2006, Directors and Directors Legacy, and uses 
different director identifiers in the two datasets. Using either identifier will omit director-year 
observations and lead to incorrect measures of board size and fraction of female directors. The 
unique identifier dataset is kindly provided by Lalitha Naveen on her website. The dataset also 
links the ISS firm identifier (CUSIP) to Compustat/CRSP firm identifier (GVKEY/PERMNO). 
(https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/) 
7 The dataset is provided by Noah Stoffman on his website. This dataset covers more patents 
and corresponding firms than NBER patents data mainly because the patent text files provided 
by Google have better quality than the files provided by USPTO, so more patent assignees can 
be identified. More details of the patent data construction can be found in the paper and the 
online appendix of Kogan et al. (2017). (https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents) 
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different patents, I drop innovation data after 2007. 
Harvard Business School (HBS) Patent and Inventor database (Li et al., 2014) provides 
inventors’ full names for each patent.8 To identify the gender of inventors by the first 
name, I utilize the new-born baby names data from the Social Security Administration. 
It includes the frequency of first names that are given to new-born babies of each gender 
in each year. An inventor is coded as female (male) if more than 90% of the babies born 
between 22 to 60 years ago are female (male). This procedure drops inventors with rare 
or gender-neutral first names and allows me to identify the gender of inventors that filed 
more than 80% of the patents. 
1.2.2 Variables 
I employ various measures of innovation to capture different aspects of a firm’s 
innovation performance, including the number of patents filed in each year and the 
number of citations received by patents in the subsequent years. I count patents at the 
time when they are filed with the USPTO because inventors have the incentives to file 
the patent as soon as it is finished, and thus the filing date is the closest to the actual 
time of innovation. I count citations after the grant date of a patent because this is when 
a patent is revealed to the public and starts to be cited. Because the distribution is 
positively skewed, I use the natural logarithm of these innovation measures. 
The number of patents and citations are intuitive measures but have their limitations. 
They are meaningful only when used comparatively, a firm with 10 patents in one 
research area and another firm with 100 patents in a different area do not say which 
firm is more innovative. Therefore, I evaluate the patent intensity with references to 
some “benchmark” intensity. I follow Bena and Li (2014) to calculate the patent index 
of each firm. The patent index is the patent number adjusted by the median value of 
each technology class. In addition, I follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) to 
measure the originality and generality of patents. Generality measures the level of the 
widespread impact of patents. Originality measures the range of fields of citations a 
 
8 Available at: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent. 
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patent made.9 In the regression analyses, I use these measures of innovation output as 
the dependent variables. I then merge the patent and citation data with the inventor data 
and calculate the measures of innovation output by gender in each firm-year.  
Another commonly used measure of innovation is R&D expenditures, but 65 percent 
of firm-year observations in Compustat have missing values. Missing R&D 
expenditures in financial statements do not necessarily mean that the firm is not 
innovative (Koh and Reeb, 2015). Therefore, compared to R&D expenditures, patent-
based metrics better reflect the productivity of R&D and more realistically reflect a 
firm’s innovation performance.  
The key independent variable is board gender diversity, measured as the fraction of 
directors that are female. In the multivariate tests, I include control variables that may 
affect firm innovation and board gender diversity at the same time. Log(Sales) is the 
natural logarithm of total sales to measure firm size. ROA is the return on assets, defined 
as the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Leverage is the total 
debt divided by total assets. Tangibility is the total gross property, plant, and equipment 
divided by total assets. M/B is the ratio of market value to book value of assets.  
For firm-year observations that exist in the director dataset but are missing in the 
innovation dataset, I replace the missing innovation output measures with zeros. 
Because the study is to examine the effect on innovation, I drop firms that never filed 
patents during the sample period. Since boards of directors for highly regulated firms 
are systematically different from boards of directors of other firms (e.g., Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988), I drop all firms in the financial industry (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities industry (SIC codes 4900). Lastly, I drop observations where control variables 
have missing values. The final sample period is from 1996 to 2007, with 7,500 firm-
year observations and 1,311 unique firms. 
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of firm innovations, the board of directors, and 
control variables. An average firm files 43 patents a year, has 9 directors on board, and 
less than one of them is a female director. 
 
9 Detailed definitions are in Appendix A. 
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1.3 Empirical Results 
1.3.1 The Determinants of Board Diversity 
If board composition is endogenously determined, we would expect it to vary across 
firms with different characteristics. Table 1.2, Panel A reports the correlation between 
board gender diversity and firm characteristics to see what firms tend to have more 
female directors on board. The dependent variable is the fraction of directors that are 
female in columns 1 and 2, and the fraction of directors that are female independent 
directors in columns 3 and 4. The independent variables include firm characteristics 
(size, ROA, market-to-book ratio, etc.), board characteristics (board size and CEO’s 
position on the board), and firm location characteristics. I control for location 
characteristics because board gender diversity varies by location. For example, boards 
of firms headquartered in New York and Florida are more diversified than firms in 
Texas and Oregon (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker, 2018). Gender diversity also varies 
by industry and by year. In my sample, the Female Directors Ratio is 15.7% in the retail 
industry and 6.8% in the electrical equipment industry; the ratio increased from 6.9% 
in 1996 to 11.2% in 2007. To control for these variations in the three dimensions, I 
include year fixed effects and industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects in all 
specifications. I add headquarter county fixed effects in columns 2 and 4. 
Panel A shows the correlation between board diversity and firm characteristics rather 
than presenting causal relationships. The results in Table 1.1.2 show that Female 
Directors Ratio is higher in firms that are larger, older, pay more dividends, and have a 
higher market-to-book ratio. It indicates that mature firms care about board gender 
diversity. Larger board size correlates with more female directors. Firm local conditions 
do not have much of an effect on board gender diversity after controlling for firm 
characteristics. 
In Panel B, I use a duration model to test the determinants of appointing a female 
director. It addresses the concern of reverse causality that firms may appoint female 
directors after female inventors file more patents. The “failure event” is firms adding a 
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female director to the board for the first time during the sample period. Firms are 
dropped from the sample once they have a female director on the board. I also exclude 
firms that have female directors when they first appear in the sample. The explanatory 
variables include innovation output, firm characteristics, and county characteristics. I 
measure the innovation activity by the natural logarithm of the number of patents filed 
by the firm and by female inventors in the firm, and the number of citations received 
by those patents. 
The results in Panel B show that the coefficients on the measures of innovation output 
are small and insignificant. It indicates that the timing of the appointment of the first 
female director is not related to previous innovation activity in the firm. The coefficients 
on Log(Sales) and Log(Board Size) are positive and significant, meaning that larges 
firm size and having more directors on the board increase the “hazard” of adding a 
female director. The coefficient on firm age is negative, and this is not surprising 
because the test is conditioning on firms that do not have female directors when they 
join the sample. Older firms are less likely to add a female director soon if they have 
not had one already. Other variables have insignificant coefficients, indicating that 
those variables (e.g., ROA, market to book ratio, cash, personal income per capita in 
the county) do not determine the timing of adding a female director for the first time. 
1.3.2 Female Directors and Female Inventors 
The first conjecture is that the higher fraction of female directors signals a female-
friendly firm culture. Therefore, the innovation output of female inventors should be 
higher in firms with a more diversified board, and the increase is larger relative to male 
inventors. To test this prediction, I run the following OLS regressions with an 
interaction term: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  +  𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔                                     + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔  + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                     (1.1) 
where Female Director Ratio is the number of female directors divided by the total 
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number of directors on the board. Female is a dummy that equals one for innovation 
output by women and equals zero for innovation output by men. The sample is at the 
firm-year-gender level. Table 1.3 presents the baseline results. Regressions in Panel A 
include all control variables, industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects, headquarters 
county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Panel B replaces industry and county fixed 
effects with firm-gender fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
The results in Table 1.3, Panel A show that board gender diversity is associated with 
higher innovation output by female inventors, compared to male inventors, and the 
association is statistically significant in four out of five specifications. In column 1, the 
coefficient on the Female dummy is -1.126, indicating that the number of patents filed 
by females is 32.43% (=exp(-1.126)) of the number of patents filed by males. It is 
consistent with the summary statistics that only 15% of the patents have a female 
inventor. The coefficient on Female Directors Ratio indicates that having one more 
female director is associated with 6.2% (=(1/9.093)*0.564) more patents filed by male 
inventors and 10% more patents filed by female inventors. The different effect of board 
gender diversity on female and male inventors is significant when innovation output is 
measured by citations, tech-class adjusted patents, generality, and originality. Panel A 
uses industry fixed effects to explore the cross-sectional variations. The results may be 
biased by omitted variables. For example, firms may have more women leaders and 
more female inventors if their products are marketed to women, compared to other 
firms in the same industry. 
In Panel B, I control for firm-gender fixed effects and find similar results, indicating 
that the results in Panel A cannot be explained by omitted time-invariant firm 
characteristics. Within a firm, having more female directors on the board is associated 
with more innovation output by female inventors. Results in column 1 indicate that one 
more female director is associated with 2.9% (=(1/9.093)*(-0.222+0.482)) more patents 
filed by female inventors. The magnitude is smaller than Panel A because board gender 
diversity has smaller within-firm variations compared to cross-sectional variations. 
However, within-firm tests do not control for omitted time-varying factors, for example, 
firm culture changes to be more female-friendly, and it leads to more female directors 
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and more female inventors. The results in Table 1.3 should be interpreted as an 
association, rather than a causal relation, between female directors and female inventors. 
The next question is whether female directors affect female inventors on the extensive 
margin or intensive margin, i.e., whether the higher output by females is driven by more 
female inventors or more productive female inventors. Table 1.4 presents results to 
answer this question. In Panel A, column 1, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
net hiring of inventors by gender, and the regression controls for industry fixed effects. 
An inventor is counted as a new hire if she files a patent for a firm for the first time 
during the sample period. Results show that higher Female Directors Ratio is associated 
with more hiring of female inventors, compared to make inventors. In column 2, the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the total number of inventors, and the regression 
controls for firm-gender fixed effects. An inventor works for a firm between the first 
year and last year she files a patent for the firm. There is a significant association 
between female directors and the number of female inventors in the firm. 
In Panel B, the outcome variable is the productivity of inventors by gender. Regressions 
in columns 1 and 2 use firm-level data, where I measure productivity by the logarithm 
of the number of patents (citations received by patents) divided by the number of 
inventors. Results in column 1 show that one more female director is associated with 
6.8% (=(1/9.093)*0.622) more patents filed by female inventors compared to male 
inventors. The difference is statistically significant. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 use 
inventor level data, where I measure productivity by the logarithm of the number of 
patents (citations received by patents) filed by each inventor. The regressions include 
inventor fixed effects to adjust for omitted time-invariant factors at the inventor level. 
The result in column 3 shows that an average female inventor files 0.9% 
(=(1/9.093)*(0.0805)) more patents when a firm has an additional female director, 
compared to male inventors. The magnitude of the inventor-level result is smaller than 
the firm-level result because a large sample, while it increases the power of regressions, 
also introduces more noise. For example, inactive innovators that filed one patent 
during the sample period will attenuate the estimate. Nevertheless, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 3. Results in 
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Table 1.4 indicate that female directors are positively associated with both the number 
and the productivity of female inventors.  
1.3.3 The Distribution of Citations 
The previous subsection shows female-friendly firm culture’s effect on the total number 
of patents filed and the total number of citations received by female inventors. Still, the 
effect on the distribution of citations is unclear. In other words, female inventors may 
generate more breakthrough inventions or inventions with no contribution. On the one 
hand, female inventors may focus on quantity over quality of patents because the 
number of patents is a simple countable measure of their performance. On the other 
hand, female-friendly firms may have a higher tolerance for failed projects conducted 
by female employees. Therefore, female inventors may pursue risky research and 
generate more important patents and fewer failed inventions.  
To test these two possible outcomes, I follow Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso (2017) 
to model the number of patents of different levels of importance. I categorize patents 
into four groups: 1) Breakthrough patents that receive citations within the top 1% 
among all patents in the same technology class and application year; 2) Important 
patents that receive citations within the top 2% - 10% among all patents in the same 
technology class and application year; 3) Incremental patents that receive citations 
outside the top 10% among all patents in the same technology class and application 
year, and; 4) Failed inventions that receive zero citations. I calculate the number of 
patents in each of the four groups that are filed by male inventors and female inventors, 
respectively. Table 1.5 reports the corresponding results.  
The regressions control for firm-gender fixed effects. The estimates in column 1 show 
that female inventors file more breakthrough patents in firms with more female 
directors on board. Female inventors also file more important patents, but the effect is 
statistically insignificant, as shown in column 2. Results in columns 3 and 4 find that 
female inventors file significantly fewer patents that receive zero citations and file more 
patents that have a marginal contribution. The results are consistent with the hypothesis 
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that female inventors conduct riskier research, create fewer failed patents and more 
important inventions.   
1.3.4 Directors Heterogeneity 
In this subsection, I examine the effect of different types of female directors on female 
inventors. Directors are categorized by their affiliation with the firm into inside 
directors, affiliated directors, and independent directors. Independent directors are 
responsible for monitoring and advising top managers, so they have the channel to 
redirect firm culture and impact female inventors. I then calculate the fraction of 
directors that are female independent directors and the fraction of directors that are 
female non-independent directors. The test results are reported in Table 1.6, Panel A. 
The dependent variable is the innovation output by female inventors scaled by that of 
male inventors. The result in column 1 shows that more female independent directors 
are associated with more patents filed by female inventors compared to male inventors. 
The results are robust to different measures of innovation output in columns 2 to 5.  
Independent directors contribute to a firm not only with managerial experience but also 
specialized expertise. The homophily theory predicts that independent female directors 
with R&D experience or experience in high-tech firms have a larger impact on female 
inventors. I follow Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) to define R&D/Tech 
experts as independent directors whose primary firm has positive R&D expenses or is 
in high-tech industries 10 . I then calculate the fraction of directors that are female 
independent with (without) R&D/Tech experience. Results in Panel B shows that the 
effect is driven by R&D/Tech experts.  
In Panel C, I estimate the marginal effect of an additional female director and find that 
the results are driven by firms with two or more female directors on board. The results 
are consistent with the idea that the number of women needs to reach a critical mass to 
 
10 Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2004) define high-tech firms as firms in industries with 
SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 7371-7379, or 8731-8734. A few examples of 
high-tech industries are medicinal chemicals, semiconductors, and commercial biological 
research. 
15 
 
affect corporate culture. Given that finding a qualified director is time-consuming (185 
days according to Nguyen and Nielsen (2011)), it is costly for a firm to hire two female 
directors just for the signaling effect. This finding supports the view that female 
directors proactively redirect corporate culture and impact female inventors. 
1.3.5 IV Regressions 
OLS regressions do not control for time-varying omitted firm characteristics. This 
endogeneity may bias the OLS estimations in either direction. On the one hand, firms 
finding it costly to promote gender equality at the employee level may use female 
directors merely as a signal. On the other hand, firms seeing the benefits of diversity 
may promote female-friendly culture and hire female directors and female inventors at 
the same time. OLS estimates are biased upwards in the latter case and may explain the 
baseline results. Reverse causality is also a concern. Firms with better performing 
female employees may have the incentive to promote female workers to management 
positions. 
In this subsection, I use an instrumental variable to estimate the relation between female 
directors and female inventors. A valid instrumental variable needs to satisfy the 
relevance requirement and the exclusion restriction. Table A.2 of the appendix offers 
some insight on how to find a relevant instrument. ISS provides the primary employer 
of directors that sit on two or more boards. I then match it to firm characteristics to 
compare directors’ primary firm and nonprimary firms.  
Table A.2, Panel A shows that the size of a female director’s primary firm is $9,010 
million, and the size doubled for her nonprimary firm. For male directors, nonprimary 
firms are also larger than primary firms, but by a much small amount. The difference 
between female and male directors is the same for other firm characteristics such as 
market-to-book ratio, ROA, firm age, and dividend yield. The summary statistics are 
consistent with the fact that female directors are a scarce human resource, and the 
supply is limited. Female directors can pick a suitable firm to join. Panel B reports the 
distance between directors’ primary and nonprimary firms. The average distance is over 
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600 miles, and 31.4% of firm pairs are under 60 miles. This finding is consistent with 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) who find that director supply is strongly 
affected by the local director labor market.11 Male and female directors do not consider 
distance differently. Panel C examines the probability of a director joins another firm 
in the same industry. Only 7% of the primary-nonprimary firm pairs are in the same 3-
digit SIC industry; 12% of firm pairs are in the same 2-digit SIC industry or supplier-
customer related industries12. This result indicates that directors and executives in the 
same industry are not the main supply of independent directors. It is not surprising 
because the director’s managerial or specialized experience can be applied across 
industries. 
Panel D examines whether the primary and nonprimary firm of a director is connected 
by another male director. Medland (2004) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) point out the 
lack of social connection of female directors, and a female director can be observed by 
another firm through the connection of another director. Results in Panel D support this 
argument. For female directors, 86% of her primary firm and nonprimary firm are 
connected by another male director. This number is 9% for male directors. It suggests 
that social connection is critical for firms to locate potential directors. 
Therefore, I follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) to define the instrumental variable as 
the fraction of male directors that have a connection to female directors on boards of 
other nonlocal firms. I require other firms to be more than 60 miles away to ensure that 
the supply pool does not reflect the local economics condition and the local supply of 
female inventors. The instrumental variable, Connected Male Directors Ratio, may 
correlate with local directors' gender diversity and therefore violates the exclusion 
restriction. I provide the following evidence to mitigate this concern. First, the 
correlation between connected male directors and local diversity is 0.04. Second, I 
 
11  Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) include local law firms and local financial 
institutions as potential supply pool for independent director. Their measure of local supply 
should be higher than 31.4%. 
12 I follow Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2018) to define supplier-customer related industries. I use 
industry input/output data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to find 
the major supplier industry and major customer industry. 
17 
 
include local directors' gender diversity in the first stage and the second stage of the 
2SLS regression. After controlling for local diversity, Connected Male Directors Ratio 
still positively affects board gender diversity. Third, I include county fixed effects and 
find similar results. Another possibility is that male directors’ connection to female 
directors correlates with industry effects, e.g., the pharmaceutical industry has more 
productive female inventors, and its male directors are connected to more female 
directors at the same time. Therefore, I control for industry fixed effects.  
Table 1.7. Panel A reports the IV regression results. Column 1 presents the results of 
the first-stage regression. Connected Male Directors Ratio is significantly correlated 
with more female independent directors on board. In columns 2 to 6, the results show 
that innovation output by female inventors is significantly higher in firms with a higher 
fraction of female independent directors. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the 
innovation output by female inventors scaled by male inventors. The results suggest 
that a higher female independent director ratio leads to more innovation output by 
female inventors compared to male inventors. 
1.3.6 Announcement returns of female director appointments 
Board gender diversity improves female inventors’ performance, but does it create 
value for shareholders? I employ the event study methodology to analyze stock returns 
around announcements of female director appointments. Previous studies find 
significant positive announcement returns around appointments of independent outside 
directors (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011) and negative returns around sudden loss of 
independent directors (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
document an insignificant announcement return of a woman added to the board. If 
female directors have a larger impact on female inventors than male inventors, we 
should expect that the market reacts stronger for firms where female inventors are more 
important. I measure the importance of female inventors by the share of patents that are 
filed by women in an industry-year. I then divide firms into five groups based on the 
measure of importance. Using ISS data, I have 1,849 events of a female director joining 
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a firm for the first time, 284 events of firms in the top quintile, and 289 events of firms 
in the bottom quintile. 
To investigate the market reaction to new female directors, I use daily returns of a 7-
day window from CRSP for each event (from day -3 to day +3). Day 0 is the event day 
of annual meetings. I use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) to calculate 
the abnormal returns. I estimate the factor model using a 60-day estimation window. I 
require firms to have at least 45 days of data available in the estimation window and 
apply a 30-day gap between the estimation window and event window. I then calculate 
the daily risk-adjusted abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in 
the 7-day window. Consistent with the prediction, I find that firms in the top quintile 
have an average CAR of about 1%, and firms in the bottom quintile have a negative 
average CAR. Figure 1.1 shows this result. Positive market responses suggest that board 
gender diversity is value-enhancing for firms where female inventors are important 
assets. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Firm policy regarding gender diversity is a particularly important topic. In the past 30 
years, more and more organizations start to promote diversity. European countries, 
including Norway, Spain, and France, have adopted quota rules to promote gender 
diversity in corporate leadership positions. In 2018, California became the first state in 
the U.S. to adopt gender quota rules. The literature finds mixed results regarding the 
effect of gender diversity on firm performance (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Eckbo, 
Nygaard, Thorburn, 2019). This paper contributes to the discussion by examining the 
channels through which female directors could affect firm value. I hypothesize and 
provide evidence that female directors contribute to firms by cultivating a more female-
friendly culture that enhances the productivity and output of female employees. 
This paper examines the effect of female-friendly corporate culture, associated with 
female directors, on female employee’s Research and Development (R&D) activity. I 
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measure R&D activity by patents and citations to quantify to effect. This paper finds 
that a larger fraction of female directors is associated with higher productivity and 
innovation output of female inventors, compared to male inventors. The results are 
significant after controlling for industry fixed effects, firm fixed effects, or inventor 
fixed effects. The effect is driven by female directors with R&D expertise or experience 
from high-tech industries and exists in firms with two or more female directors. The 
finding is supported by the critical mass theory that the influence of a subgroup grows 
when a certain threshold is reached (Torchia, Calabrò, and Huse, 2011). It is consistent 
with the conjecture that female directors proactively redirect firm culture. 
Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), I use instrumental variable regressions and find 
a causal relationship between female directors and female inventors. The results offer 
another piece of evidence to support the homophily theory that women in leadership 
positions cultivate more female-friendly culture. However, we need to be cautious when 
interpreting the results. The IV regression estimates a local average treatment effect 
(LATE), where firms choose to hire a female director only when the benefits of diversity 
outweigh its costs (Jiang, 2017). The positive effect of gender diversified board does 
not suggest impositions of diversity on all firms. 
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1.5 Tables 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of key variables from 1996 to 2007. The 
sample includes S&P 1500 firms that are covered by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services Directors database (formerly RiskMetrics). The corporate innovation output 
data are from NBER and Kogan et al. (2017). Firm characteristics and county-level 
control variables are from Compustat and the Census Bureau. Innovative firms that 
filed at least one patent during the sample period comprise the sample. The final sample 
consists of 7,500 firm-year observations with 1,311 unique firms. The variable 
definitions are in Table A.1. 
 
  Mean Median St. Dev. 
Innovation Measures    
#Patents 42.187 3.000 184.853 
#Citations 391.598 10.000 2500.147 
#Patents - Citation weighted 86.883 5.008 400.225 
Patent Index 27.611 2.500 113.678 
Generality 0.357 0.180 0.377 
Originality 0.487 0.637 0.379 
    
Board of Director Measures    
Board Size 9.093 9.000 2.560 
#Female Directors 0.868 1.000 0.872 
#Female Independent Directors 0.775 1.000 0.823 
    
Firm Controls    
Log(Sales) 7.270 7.186 1.609 
ROA 0.134 0.137 0.099 
Leverage 0.214 0.209 0.167 
R&D/Assets 0.046 0.023 0.059 
M/B 2.152 1.694 1.403 
Tangibility 0.517 0.436 0.337 
Dividend Yield 0.012 0.003 0.026 
Cash/Assets 0.158 0.079 0.182 
Log(Age) 2.992 3.045 0.837 
    
County Controls    
Population 13.701 13.726 1.021 
Personal Income Per Capita 10.389 10.399 0.180 
Personal Income Per Capita Growth 4.502 4.700 2.024 
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Table 1.2: Determinants of the board gender diversity 
The table tests the determinant of the board gender diversity. Panel A reports the panel 
regression of the female director ratio on firm and headquarters county characteristics. 
The dependent variable is the number of female (independent) directors divided by the 
total number of directors on the board. All regressions include industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. Headquarter county fixed effects are included in columns 2 and 
4. Panel B reports the duration model where the “failure event” is the appointment of a 
female director in a firm for the first time. Firms are dropped from the sample once they 
have a female director on the board. I also exclude firms that have female directors 
when they first appear in the sample. The variable definitions are in Table A.1. The t-
statistics in the parentheses are adjusted for firm-clustering effect. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of board gender diversity: the OLS model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Female Directors Ratio 
Female Independent 
Directors Ratio 
Log(Sales) 0.0176*** 0.0148*** 0.0182*** 0.0158*** 
 (11.34) (8.711) (12.61) (9.745) 
ROA -0.0107 -0.00627 -0.00408 0.00183 
 (-0.497) (-0.325) (-0.230) (0.111) 
Leverage 0.0200* 0.0157 0.0240** 0.0159 
 (1.707) (1.455) (2.222) (1.567) 
R&D/Assets 0.0317 0.0224 0.0865** 0.0735 
 (0.587) (0.449) (1.987) (1.634) 
M/B 0.00251* 0.00300** 0.00270** 0.00239* 
 (1.697) (2.101) (2.149) (1.913) 
Tangibility 0.0157** 0.00842 0.0132* 0.00467 
 (2.084) (1.123) (1.939) (0.706) 
Dividend Yield 0.198*** 0.127** 0.163*** 0.107** 
 (3.010) (2.433) (2.827) (2.247) 
Cash/Assets -0.000979 -0.00189 -0.00855 -0.00321 
 (-0.0684) (-0.141) (-0.642) (-0.262) 
Log(Age) 0.00862*** 0.00487* 0.00869*** 0.00670** 
 (3.182) (1.768) (3.305) (2.557) 
Log(Board Size)  0.0298***  0.0181*** 
  (4.211)  (2.675) 
CEO is Chair or President  0.00917**  0.00881** 
  (1.964)  (2.076) 
Population  0.0251  0.0323 
  (0.842)  (1.201) 
Personal Income Per Capita  -0.0225  -0.00995 
  (-0.350)  (-0.164) 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
     
Personal Income Per Capita Growth  0.000252  0.000707 
  (0.301)  (0.902) 
     
Observations 7,500 7,482 7,500 7,482 
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.395 0.264 0.400 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE - Yes - Yes 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
Panel B: Timing of adding the first female director: the duration model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Log(1+Patents) -0.0132    
 (-0.273)    
Log(1+Patents by Female)  -0.00768   
  (-0.0800)   
Log(1+Citations)   0.0168  
   (0.561)  
Log(1+Citations by Female)    0.0171 
    (0.362) 
Log(Sales) 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 
 (3.442) (3.374) (3.232) (3.250) 
ROA -0.229 -0.228 -0.212 -0.202 
 (-0.341) (-0.339) (-0.314) (-0.299) 
Leverage -0.661* -0.658* -0.652* -0.655* 
 (-1.879) (-1.870) (-1.850) (-1.858) 
R&D/Assets -1.357 -1.511 -1.926 -1.747 
 (-0.921) (-1.043) (-1.304) (-1.225) 
M/B 0.0581 0.0576 0.0536 0.0537 
 (1.253) (1.238) (1.146) (1.145) 
Tangibility 0.0181 0.0162 0.0129 0.0108 
 (0.105) (0.0939) (0.0745) (0.0624) 
Dividend Yield -0.635 -0.654 -0.706 -0.653 
 (-0.222) (-0.228) (-0.242) (-0.228) 
Cash/Assets 0.165 0.164 0.159 0.159 
 (0.373) (0.370) (0.359) (0.360) 
Log(Age) -0.165* -0.165* -0.164* -0.164* 
 (-1.824) (-1.823) (-1.813) (-1.809) 
Log(Board Size) 2.255*** 2.251*** 2.242*** 2.243*** 
 (9.605) (9.615) (9.591) (9.611) 
CEO is Chair or President -0.0552 -0.0572 -0.0669 -0.0612 
 (-0.318) (-0.329) (-0.384) (-0.352) 
Population -0.0628 -0.0631 -0.0644 -0.0637 
 (-1.370) (-1.377) (-1.395) (-1.384) 
Personal Income Per Capita -0.101 -0.0985 -0.0768 -0.0906 
 (-0.252) (-0.247) (-0.191) (-0.227) 
Personal Income Per Capita Growth -0.0211 -0.0208 -0.0202 -0.0204 
 (-0.765) (-0.752) (-0.732) (-0.740) 
     
Observations 3,954 3,954 3,954 3,954 
Chi-square 159.7 159.3 157.6 158.3 
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Table 1.3: Effects of female directors on innovation output 
The table presents panel regression results estimating the effect of female director ratio on innovation output by female inventors. I use a sample 
of all S&P 1500 firms from 1996 to 2007 covered by the ISS Directors database. The variable definitions are in Table A.1. The model examines 
the effect of female director ratio on innovation output by female inventors and male inventors, using firm-year-gender level data and an interaction 
term. Female Directors Ratio is the number of female directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. Female is a dummy that 
equals one for innovation output by females and equals zero for innovation output by males. In Panel A, all regressions include industry (Fama-
French 48) fixed effects, headquarters county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In Panel B, all regressions include year fixed effects and firm-
gender fixed effects. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table A.1. The t-statistics in the parentheses are adjusted for firm-clustering effect. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: Cross-sectional tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
Female Directors Ratio 0.564 0.157 0.535 -0.0106 -0.00811 
 (1.574) (0.316) (1.578) (-0.149) (-0.103) 
Female -1.126*** -1.673*** -0.737*** -0.224*** -0.290*** 
 (-29.93) (-31.36) (-29.02) (-25.79) (-29.92) 
Female Directors Ratio × Female 0.346 1.760*** 0.639*** 0.328*** 0.462*** 
 (1.228) (4.551) (3.351) (5.036) (6.241) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.542 0.582 0.479 0.463 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
Panel B: Within-firm tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
            
Female Director Ratio -0.222 -1.233*** -0.0805 -0.0449 -0.00553 
 (-0.912) (-2.620) (-0.344) (-0.565) (-0.0762) 
Female Director Ratio × Female 0.482*** 2.053*** 0.309* 0.217*** 0.113 
 (2.589) (5.241) (1.789) (2.934) (1.531) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,782 14,782 14,782 14,782 14,782 
Adjusted R2 0.891 0.792 0.878 0.695 0.710 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.4: Extensive margin and intensive margin 
The table presents OLS regression results to examine the effect of female directors on 
the number of inventors and the innovation output per inventor. In Panel A, the outcome 
variable is the logarithm of the number of net hiring and the total number of inventors 
for each firm-year-gender. In Panel B, the outcome variable is the productivity of 
female and male inventors, as measured by the logarithm of the number of patents 
produced per inventor. In columns 1 and 2, the data is at the firm-year-gender level. In 
columns 3 and 4, the data is at the inventor-year level, and the regressions control for 
inventor fixed effects. Female Directors Ratio is the number of female directors divided 
by the total number of directors on the board. Female is a dummy that equals one for 
innovation output by females and equals zero for innovation output by males. Detailed 
definitions of all variables are in Table A.1. The t-statistics in the parentheses are 
adjusted for firm-clustering effect. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Number of inventors 
  (1) (2) 
 Log(1+#Net Hiring) Log(1+#Inventors) 
      
Female Directors Ratio -1.079*** -0.271 
 (-3.383) (-1.013) 
Female 0.0681***  
 (2.827)  
Female Directors Ratio × Female 0.991*** 0.594*** 
 (4.491) (2.684) 
   
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes 
Observations 12,760 14,782 
Adjusted R2 0.0597 0.889 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes - 
County FE Yes - 
Firm × Gender FE - Yes 
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Table 1.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Productivity of inventors 
 Firm Level Inventor Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(1+#Patents/
#Inventors) 
Log(1+#Citations/
#Inventors) 
Log(1+#Patents) Log(1+#Citation) 
        
Female Directors Ratio -0.207*** -0.628*** -0.120* -0.303* 
 (-3.512) (-3.227) (-1.848) (-1.733) 
Female -0.113*** -0.464***   
 (-10.81) (-18.04)   
Female Directors Ratio × Female 0.622*** 1.800*** 0.0805* 0.321** 
 (7.815) (9.719) (1.654) (2.018) 
     
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,000 15,000 479,615 479,615 
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.363 0.288 0.338 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes - - 
County FE Yes Yes - - 
Inventor FE - - Yes Yes 
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Table 1.5: Breakthrough patents or incremental patents 
The dependent variables are the logarithm of one plus the number of patents that fall in different bins of the citation distribution within the patent 
class and application year. The bins are classified as top 1% percentile, top 2-10% percentile, cited but not in the top 10%, and without any citations. 
The model uses firm-year-gender level data. Female Directors Ratio is the number of female directors divided by the total number of directors on 
the board. Female is a dummy that equals one for innovation output by females and equals zero for innovation output by males. All regressions 
include year fixed effects and firm-gender fixed effects. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table A.1. The t-statistics in the parentheses are 
adjusted for firm-clustering effect. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(1+Patents)  
Top 1%  
Log(1+Patents)  
Top 2-10%  
Log(1+Patents)  
Cited, not in top 10% 
Log(1+Patents)  
Without citations 
          
Female Director Ratio -0.208* -0.104 -0.729*** 0.393* 
 (-1.829) (-0.656) (-2.769) (1.720) 
Female Director Ratio × Female 0.175* 0.134 1.183*** -0.804*** 
 (1.864) (1.029) (5.954) (-4.565) 
     
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,782 14,782 14,782 14,782 
Adjusted R2 0.676 0.826 0.840 0.790 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.6: Directors heterogeneity 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions to examine the effect of independent directors and directors with R&D and technology expertise. 
The outcome variables are innovation output by females scaled by innovation output by males. In Panel A, Female Independent (Non- Independent) 
Directors Ratio is the fraction of directors that are independent (non-independent) females. In Panel B, R&D/Tech Experts Ratio is the fraction of 
directors that are independent females who have corporate experience at firms with positive R&D or high-tech firms. In Panel C, the key 
independent variables are three dummies that are equal to one if a firm has one female director, two female directors, or three or more female 
directors, respectively. All regressions include industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects, headquarter fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Detailed 
definitions of all variables are in Table A.1. The t-statistics in the parentheses are adjusted for firm-clustering effect. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Independent female directors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
 F/M F/M F/M F/M F/M 
       
Female Independent Directors Ratio 0.159** 0.205*** 0.191** 0.313*** 0.200** 
 (2.288) (2.801) (2.023) (2.902) (2.348) 
Female Non-Independent Directors Ratio -0.158 -0.181 -0.101 0.0747 0.00722 
 (-1.225) (-1.533) (-0.641) (0.453) (0.0508) 
      
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,483 7,485 7,483 7,489 7,491 
R-squared 0.306 0.304 0.329 0.315 0.321 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.6 (continued) 
Panel B: Directors with R&D and high-tech expertise 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
 F/M F/M F/M F/M F/M 
       
R&D/Tech Experts Ratio 0.335*** 0.293** 0.463*** 0.423*** 0.358** 
 (2.979) (2.385) (3.041) (2.669) (2.269) 
Non-Experts Ratio 0.0735 0.123 0.0656 0.253** 0.0856 
 (0.957) (1.533) (0.639) (2.012) (0.935) 
      
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,465 7,467 7,465 7,471 7,473 
R-squared 0.359 0.347 0.385 0.372 0.370 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.6 (continued) 
Panel C: Marginal effect of an additional female director 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
 F/M F/M F/M F/M F/M 
       
#Female Directors = 1 0.00791 0.0170 0.0123 0.0262 0.0269* 
 (0.736) (1.375) (0.801) (1.602) (1.817) 
#Female Directors = 2 0.0471*** 0.0427** 0.0580** 0.0910*** 0.0383* 
 (2.785) (2.343) (2.536) (3.419) (1.799) 
#Female Directors >= 3 0.0498* 0.0636** 0.0486 0.104*** 0.0827** 
 (1.873) (2.153) (1.495) (3.023) (2.514) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,465 7,467 7,465 7,471 7,473 
R-squared 0.359 0.347 0.384 0.374 0.370 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 1.7: Instrumental variable regressions 
The table presents the results of two-stage least squares regressions to examine the causal relationship between female independent director ratio 
and innovation output by female inventors. The instrumental variable, Connected Male Directors Ratio, is the fraction of male directors who have 
connections to female directors in nonlocal firms that are more than 60 miles away. In Panel A, column 1 reports the first-stage result, where I 
regress Female Independent Directors Ratio on the instrumental variable and control variables. In the second stage, the dependent variables are 
the measures of innovation output by female inventors. I regress these measures on the predicted Female Independent Directors Ratio, and the 
results are reported in columns 2 to 7. In Panel B, the dependent variable in the second stage is the ratio of female innovation output divided by 
male innovation output. I regress this ratio on the predicted Female Independent Director Ratio, and the results are reported in columns 1 to 6. All 
regressions include industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects and year fixed effects. I include local director diversity instead of headquartering 
county fixed effects. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table A.1. The t-statistics in the parentheses are adjusted for firm-clustering effect. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Innovation output by female inventors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Independent Directors Ratio Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
              
Connected Male Directors Ratio 0.0293***      
 (2.780)      
Female Independent Directors Ratio  17.31** 22.28** 20.53** 3.957** 6.171** 
  (2.282) (2.117) (2.202) (2.214) (2.536) 
Local Female Directors Ratio 0.116** -1.454 -1.736 -1.995 -0.340 -0.681 
 (2.083) (-0.845) (-0.765) (-0.908) (-0.968) (-1.344) 
       
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,360 7,343 7,345 7,343 7,352 7,351 
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Table 1.7 (continued) 
 
Adjusted/Centered R2 0.279 -0.462 -0.170 -0.322 -0.375 -0.984 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV F-stat 29.902      
Underidentification test (P-value) 0.006           
 
Panel B: Innovation output by female inventors, scaled by male inventors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Log(1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) Patent Index Generality Originality 
 F/M F/M F/M F/M F/M 
      
Female Independent Directors Ratio 2.619** 2.195** 4.747** 4.696** 6.830** 
 (2.351) (2.161) (2.396) (2.165) (2.464) 
Local Female Directors Ratio -0.369* -0.201 -0.686 -0.382 -0.851 
 (-1.750) (-1.111) (-1.598) (-0.890) (-1.470) 
      
Firm and HQ county controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,343 7,345 7,343 7,352 7,351 
Adjusted / Centered R2 -0.642 -0.298 -0.652 -0.312 -0.728 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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1.6 Figures 
Figure 1.1: Announcement returns of female director appointments 
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a 7-day window [-3, 
3] around appointments of a new female director, where announcements occur on day 
0. The sample contains 1,849 events of a female director joining a firm for the first time 
between 1997 and 2007. I sort firms into quintiles based on the importance of female 
inventors of an industry to which a firm belongs. The importance is measured by the 
share of patents that are filed by women in that industry. The graphs on the left use 
firms in the top quintile (284 events), and the graphs on the right use firms in the bottom 
quintile (289 events). Panel A reports the CAPM cumulative returns, and Panel B 
reports the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
Panel A: CAPM returns, top quintile versus bottom quintile 
 
 
Panel B: Four-factor returns, top quintile versus bottom quintile 
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Chapter 2 Mutual Fund Preference for Pure-Play Firms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature has found that corporate organizational form impacts a firm in many ways 
such as firm valuation, systematic risk, cash holdings, and payout policy (e.g., 
Villalonga, 2004; Duchin, 2010; Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas, 2013; Jordan, Liu, Wu, 
2018). To date, however, no studies examine how organizational form affects mutual 
fund investment decisions. Are corporations with only one segment preferred by mutual 
funds compared to conglomerates that have diversified business? If yes, why? And do 
mutual fund characteristics contribute to such preference related to organizational 
forms? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions. We find that actively managed mutual 
funds have a preference for pure-play firms over conglomerates.1 The magnitude is 
large: mutual fund ownership (MFO) of conglomerates is 1.029% lower than that of a 
portfolio of pure-play firms in the same segments and of similar size. We measure MFO 
by the fraction of shares outstanding held by actively managed mutual funds, and in our 
sample, the average MFO is 7.657%. The 1.029% difference in MFO between 
conglomerates and a portfolio of pure-play firms represents a 13% deviation from the 
mean. 
To find out the reason behind mutual funds’ preference for pure-play firms over 
conglomerates, we test the “industry expertise hypothesis.” Actively managed mutual 
funds may have expertise in specific industries. In fact, an average mutual fund in our 
sample invests 60% of its equity into 14 out of 360 industries classified by the 3-digit 
SIC code. Therefore, by holding pure-play firms in industries in which they have the 
expertise, mutual funds can invest 100% of their money in these industries. In contrast, 
if they invest in conglomerate firms, their investment will be diluted by industries in 
 
1 Throughout the paper, we use conglomerates and multi-segment firms interchangeably. We 
do the same with pure-play firms, pureplays, and single-segment firms. 
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which they may not have expertise, unless the conglomerate operates in the desired 
industries by chance. As a result, we should observe mutual funds prefer firms that help 
them exploit the industry expertise, and the preference should be more pronounced 
among funds with a higher level of industry expertise. Funds utilizing such strategies 
should have better performance and exhibit industry selecting and industry timing 
ability. 
Consistent with the predictions of the industry expertise hypothesis, we find that firms 
that operate in more segments and have more diversified sales have lower mutual fund 
ownership. We also find that mutual funds prefer stocks with greater industry beta and 
industry R-squared. Further, we divide actively managed mutual funds into five groups 
based on the industry concentration of their holdings, following Kacperczyk, Sialm, 
and Zheng (2005). We find that only the top two quintiles of mutual funds show a 
preference for pure-play firms over conglomerates, while the other three quintiles do 
not. Both firm-level and fund-level cross-sectional variations show strong support that 
mutual funds’ industry expertise drives the preference for pureplays.  
To further test that the preference is caused by mutual funds’ expertise other than 
fundamental differences between the two organizational forms, we perform a 
falsification test and a difference-in-difference test. First, we construct a “pseudo 
conglomerate” for each actual conglomerate in our sample using a portfolio of pure-
play firms in the same segment and of similar size. These pseudo conglomerates serve 
as control firms. Our falsification test shows that actual conglomerates have 
significantly lower MFO than pseudo conglomerates, indicating that controlling for 
firm characteristics that are associated with industry and size does not alter our results. 
Second, we consider a sample of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and find a decrease 
in MFO around conglomerating M&As. Because we examine the change in MFO of 
the same firm around an M&A, we capture the within-firm change and control for time-
invariant firm characteristics. Further, the decrease in MFO is more pronounced when 
the degree of segment sales concentration has a larger drop after the M&A, consistent 
with the industry expertise hypothesis. 
If the preference for pure-play firms is a proxy for industry expertise, we should expect 
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mutual funds in our sample to benefit from this preference. Using mutual fund quarterly 
holdings data, we create an index, Pureplayness, that measures a mutual fund’s fraction 
of assets invested in pure-play firms. Our results show that this measure is very 
persistent within funds over time. This finding suggests that the preference for pure-
play firms is driven by systematic fund characteristics, such as mutual fund managers’ 
informational advantage in specific industries that tend to persist over time. We then 
test what fund characteristics determine the Pureplayness. For example, we find that 
higher Pureplayness is associated with a higher turnover ratio and higher expenses. 
Furthermore, we construct five portfolios of funds based on their Pureplayness level 
and find that funds in the top quintile of Pureplayness outperform funds in the bottom 
quintile by 1.7% per annum after adjusted for risks represented by the six-factor model 
of Fama and French (2014) and Carhart (1997). Since Pureplayness and Industry 
Concentration Index (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005) both measure industry 
expertise, we control for Industry Concentration Index and find similar results. Lastly, 
we follow Daniel, et al., (1997) and measure the characteristic-based returns. The 
results indicate that the superior performance of high-Pureplayness funds is mainly 
driven by their industry picking and industry timing ability, which is consistent with 
our industry expertise hypothesis. 
Actively managed mutual funds having industry expertise and higher demand for pure-
play firms are the result of comparing mutual funds to other investors. Is it true that 
mutual funds have industry expertise even when compared to hedge funds and other 
institutional investors? Results in Table B.2 of the appendix show that hedge funds and 
other institutional investors have a weaker and non-robust preference towards pure-play 
firms. The finding suggests that the preference for pure-play firms are especially strong 
for mutual funds relative to other institutional investors. 
Our study contributes to several different branches of finance literature. First, we 
document how the organizational form of a firm affects mutual fund holdings. Our 
results suggest that a firm’s organizational form affects the degree of industry 
information reflected in stock price. This, in turn, impacts how actively managed 
mutual funds invest in the firm’s stock because this affects how much of their 
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investments will be allocated to the industry in which they have expertise. 
Second, we contribute to studies on mutual funds by documenting their preference for 
pure-play firms, and by offering another piece of evidence of their industry expertise. 
The existing literature documents that institutional investors favor stock characteristics 
that fit their needs. For example, liquidity and voting rights are valued by institutional 
investors (Falkenstein, 1996; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Li, Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao, 2008) 
because stock liquidity lowers the cost of fire sales, and voting rights offer monitoring 
power to the institutional investors. In the same spirit, we examine whether actively 
managed mutual funds prefer pure-play firms to conglomerates, and what 
characteristics cause this preference. Furthermore, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005) show that mutual funds generate higher returns if they concentrate their holdings 
in a few industries. Our results support the notion that some mutual funds exhibit 
industry expertise. They exploit this expertise by investing more in single-segment 
firms and earn higher returns. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: We discuss the related literature 
in Section 2.2. Data and sample construction are described in Section 2.3. Our firm-
level results are reported in Section 2.4. After controlling for industry fixed effects, time 
fixed effects, and firm characteristics, we find higher mutual fund ownership in pure-
play firms. This finding survives the falsification test and tests in an M&A setting. 
Section 2.5 reports the fund-level results. Higher pureplay holding predicts higher risk-
adjusted returns. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This paper is related to several strands of literature. It complements the research on firm 
boundaries and corporate diversification. Since Coase (1937) proposed that firm 
boundaries affect resource allocation, there have been numerous studies related to firm 
boundaries. The earlier literature documents a “diversification discount,” suggesting 
that the internal capital market is inefficient (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1996; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). The over-active internal capital market and 
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information asymmetries between central management and divisional managers lead to 
strategic information transmission and agency problems in diversified firms (Harris, 
Kriebel, and Raviv, 1982; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Seru, 2014). Other studies 
show a “bright side” of diversification. After considering the endogeneity problem, the 
literature finds a value premium associated with firm diversification (Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004; Gasper and Massa, 2011; Maksimovic and Philips, 2013). The 
internal capital market offers coinsurance among segments. It allows conglomerates to 
hold significantly less cash, pay out more dividends than pureplays, have lower 
systematic risk, lower costs of external financing, and lower skewness exposure 
(Duchin, 2010; Mitton and Vorkink, 2010; Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas, 2013; Jordan, 
Liu, and Wu, 2018). To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to link mutual fund 
investments to corporate organizational form. 
This paper is also related to the literature on institutional investors. The existing 
literature shows that mutual funds prefer more liquid stocks, larger stocks, stocks with 
higher price levels, and stocks that have a single share class (Falkenstein, 1996; Li, 
Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao, 2008). Our results show that organizational forms of firms can 
also affect mutual funds’ investment decisions. Our paper focuses on actively managed 
mutual funds to alleviate the concerns that other institutional investors might face 
investment constraints regarding organizational forms. 
Finally, our research contributes to the literature that explores mutual fund skills. 
Utilizing the quarterly holding filings, earlier literature has developed various measures 
of manager skill, including characteristic-adjusted returns, stock selectivity, industry 
concentration index, tracking errors, active shares, etc. (Daniel, et al., 1997; Wermers, 
2000; Pinnuck, 2003; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 
2009). More recent papers use institutional investors’ daily trading data to measure 
manager styles (Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Trzcinka, 2017; Russell, 2017; Farrell, 
2018). We find evidence that mutual funds’ holding of pure-play firms is a proxy of 
industry expertise, and it is positively related to future performance. 
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2.3 Data and Sample Construction 
The sample construction begins with all firms with data reported to the Compustat 
Industry Segment database. A firm is required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to report information for segments that represent 10% or more of 
the consolidated firm’s sales. We focus on business segments and use the latest source 
year of each segment-year observation. We follow the Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2018) 
sample selection criteria to exclude observations where firms report segments in the 
financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), utility sector (SIC 4900-4999), or firms with a market 
capitalization less than $10 million. We only include stocks whose 8-digit CUSIP 
identifier ends with either 10 or 11, to make sure they are common stocks. Following 
Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas (2013), we define a firm as a pure-play firm if it has only 
one 3-digit SIC segment; otherwise, we define it as a conglomerate. 
The mutual fund data come from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. 
The database includes information on total net assets, investment objectives, investment 
styles, fund holdings, and other fund characteristics. We follow Jordan and Riley (2015) 
and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) to build our sample of actively managed U.S. 
equity funds. We drop funds that 1) are identified by CRSP as index funds, EFTs, or 
annuities; 2) have a fixed income Lipper asset code; 3) are sector funds; 4) have terms 
in their name not associated with unleveraged, active, or equity investment. 2  We 
require the funds to have more than 80% of assets invested in equity and report expense 
ratios above 0.1% per year, since it is improbable that any actively managed funds 
would charge such low fees. We also require the funds to be identified as domestic 
equity funds by CRSP because we are analyzing their behavior concerning U.S. firms 
with different organizational forms. 
The stockholdings of mutual funds are collected both from reports filed by mutual funds 
 
2 The list of terms we use in our name search is available on request. For example, we drop 
mutual funds that have the word “Index”, “S&P”, or “Sector” in their fund names. The final 
dataset for the main analysis does not include any equity domestic sector funds (CRSP objective 
code begins with “EDS” or Lipper classification code indicates that the fund is a sector fund). 
In untabulated tests, sector funds show a significant preference towards pure-play firms. 
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with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the funds. Most of the holdings 
of companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and the NASDAQ. Mutual funds are required to report their 
holdings to the SEC at the end of each quarter. Some funds choose to report their 
holdings even more frequently, on a monthly basis. To be consistent with the majority 
of funds, we construct our sample on a quarterly basis. For mutual funds that report 
holdings more frequently than every quarter, we use the end-of-quarter values. To 
measure the mutual fund ownership (MFO), we calculate the percentage as the number 
of shares held by mutual funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
We obtain accounting information such as the book value of equity and earnings from 
Compustat. Firm age and stock return information are from CRSP. For firms whose 
data exist in Compustat and CRSP but are missing in the mutual fund holding dataset, 
we replace the missing MFO values with zeros. Our final sample period is from 2003 
to 2015, with 107,501 firm-quarter observations, 4,783 unique firms, of which 1,159 
are conglomerates. 
In our multivariate analyses, we use mutual fund ownership (MFO) as the dependent 
variable. Our key test variable is a firm’s organizational form, PurePlay, which equals 
one if the firm is a pure-play firm that operates in only one 3-digit SIC code industry, 
and zero otherwise. Following Falkenstein (1996) and Li, Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao 
(2008), we include variables that affect institutional investment decisions. Market 
capitalization, Mkt cap, is defined as the dollar value of all outstanding shares at the 
end of the quarter. The quarterly return on the firm’s stock, Return, is defined as the 
stock return over the quarter. The quarterly share turnover ratio, Turnover, is defined as 
the ratio of the trading volume to the number of shares outstanding of the quarter. The 
market-to-book ratio, M/B, is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets. Financial leverage, Leverage, is computed as the ratio of total debt to 
the market value of assets, following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). Share price, 
Price, is defined as the stock price at the end of the quarter. Return on assets, ROA, is 
net income divided by total assets. Spread is the average of the monthly trading spread 
of the stock in the quarter. The legal environment that institutions face as fiduciaries 
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may also lead to the preference related to organizational form. Del Guercio (1996) 
suggests that firm age, dividend yield, S&P membership, and stock price volatility have 
appeared in the prudence case law that affect institutional equity investments. The 
dividend yield, Divyield, is the ratio of total dividends to the market value of equity. 
S&P500 is a dummy equal to one for S&P 500 index stocks. The volatility of stock 
returns, Retvol, is the stock return volatility using monthly stock returns over the 
previous 12 months. Firm age, Age, is the number of years since the firm first appears 
in CRSP.  
Table 2.1, Panel A reports the summary statistics of mutual fund ownership (MFO) and 
control variables across conglomerates and pureplays. The univariate tests show that 
mutual fund ownership is higher in conglomerates; it is not surprising because mutual 
funds prefer larger and more liquid stocks, which are the characteristics of 
conglomerates. The majority of firm characteristics are significantly different, 
suggesting that firm and stock characteristics differ substantially between 
conglomerates and pureplays. We control for these variables that potentially affect 
mutual fund ownership in the multivariate regressions. Panel B reports the correlation 
matrix of these variables. 
2.4 Firm Level Analysis 
2.4.1 Mutual fund ownership in conglomerates versus pureplays 
To estimate the effect of organizational form on the investment decision of actively 
managed mutual funds, we regress mutual fund ownership (MFO) on the PurePlay 
dummy and other firm characteristics as control variables. Unless otherwise specified, 
we include the quarter fixed effect, and the Fama-French 48 industry fixed effect in all 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and quarter levels (2-way 
clustering). The coefficient on PurePlay captures the difference of mutual fund 
ownership between conglomerates and pureplays. Table 2.2 reports the results from the 
following regression. 
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 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (2.1) 
In Table 2.2, we run OLS panel regressions. We do not include any control variables in 
the first specification. The coefficient on PurePlay is negative, which is consistent with 
the summary statistics in Table 2.1. However, after we add more control variables in 
specification 2 to 5, the coefficients on PurePlay become positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all four models, indicating that the average mutual fund 
ownership in pure-play firms is higher than that of conglomerates. The coefficients 
converge to 0.615 in column 5, suggesting that after controlling for firm and industry 
characteristics, mutual funds ownership is 0.615% higher in pure-play firms than 
conglomerates. 
2.4.2 Falsification tests 
Results in Table 2.2 indicate that mutual fund ownerships are different between 
conglomerates and pureplays even after controlling for many firm characteristics such 
as size, firm performance, leverage, and book to market ratio. However, it remains the 
case that the difference could be due to unobservable omitted variables. For example, a 
lack of future investment opportunities may lead a firm into diversification while 
actively managed mutual funds tend to avoid such firms. We would observe a difference 
in mutual fund ownership between conglomerates and pureplays even though the 
difference is not caused by organizational form. To address these concerns, we follow 
previous literature to perform a falsification test (Campello, 2002; McNeil, Niehaus, 
and Powers, 2004; Jordan, Liu, and Wu, 2018). 
For each segment of an actual conglomerate, we select a single segment firm in the 
segment’s industry with the closest value of book assets, total sales, or operating profit, 
or imputed market capitalization. Because market capitalization is not available for 
segments, we use each segment’s book asset multiplied by the conglomerate’s market-
to-book ratio to get the imputed market capitalization of each segment. We then 
construct a “pseudo-conglomerate” for each actual conglomerate in the first year the 
conglomerate appears in our sample, with the pseudo conglomerate having the same 
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portfolio of segments as the actual conglomerate. We use book value weighted variables 
of each single-segment firm3 to create the variables for pseudo conglomerates. Because 
pure-play firms have higher market-to-book ratio than conglomerates (as shown in 
Table 2.1), a match by book value might lead to a higher market value of pseudo-
conglomerates, and higher market value correlates with higher mutual fund ownership. 
To address this concern, we also construct pseudo-conglomerates using imputed market 
capitalization. We then run the following regression using all actual conglomerates and 
pseudo conglomerates: 
 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2.2) 
where Actuali,t takes value 1 for actual conglomerates and 0 for pseudo-conglomerates. 
The standard errors are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels (two-way 
clustering). Table 2.3 reports the results. 
In column 1, we use book assets to construct the pseudo-conglomerates, and the 
coefficient on the Actual dummy is -1.029 and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the mutual fund ownership for actual conglomerates is about 1.029% 
lower than that of the pseudo conglomerates. Since the average MFO in our sample is 
7.657% (untabulated), the difference represents a 13% deviation from the mean value. 
In columns 2-4, we use sales, operating profits, and imputed market capitalization to 
construct the pseudo-conglomerates. Results are all statistically significant and 
qualitatively similar. 
In summary, the falsification test in Table 2.3 shows that conglomerates have lower 
mutual fund ownership than portfolios of similarly sized stand-alone firms in the same 
segments. The result indicates that the difference in mutual fund ownership between 
conglomerates and pureplays cannot be explained by characteristics that are purely 
related to industry and firm size that happen to be correlated with mutual fund 
ownerships. 
 
3 Using sales or operating profit to calculate weights gives similar results. 
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2.4.3 Explanations of the preference 
In this section, we ask the question of why mutual fund investors differ from other 
investors in their demand for single-segment firms. We propose and find evidence to 
support the industry expertise hypothesis. 
The industry expertise hypothesis posits that actively managed mutual funds exhibit 
industry expertise. For example, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) find that mutual 
funds with greater industry concentrations in their stock holdings perform better than 
other mutual funds. By definition, the values of pure-play firms in a particular industry 
are affected by one industry factor (plus market movement and idiosyncratic 
movements), but not industry factors in other industries. In contrast, the values of 
conglomerates are affected by two or more industry factors. When active mutual funds 
have private information about a particular industry, they will naturally prefer pureplays 
to conglomerates since pureplays allow these mutual funds to invest 100% of their 
money in that industry, while conglomerates will dilute their investment. The industry 
expertise hypothesis predicts that the preference is stronger for active mutual funds who 
exhibit higher industry concentration. Furthermore, different pure-play firms in an 
industry are affected by the industry factor to varying degrees. Firms with a higher 
industry beta are influenced more by the industry factor and should be more valuable 
in utilizing funds’ industry expertise. Accordingly, the industry expertise hypothesis has 
three testable predictions: 
1) MFO is lower in more diversified firms. 
2) The preference for pure-play firms is stronger for mutual funds with a higher level 
of industry expertise. 
3) MFO is higher in firms with higher industry beta or industry R-squared. 
To begin with, we create two measures of firm diversification. #Segments is the number 
of business segments a firm operates in. Holding other things constant, a firm that 
operates in more segments is likely to be more diversified. The second measure is the 
Herfindahl index of sales of various segments in a firm. A lower Herfindahl index 
signifies more diversification of a conglomerate. By definition, both the #Segments and 
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the Herfindahl Index of a pureplay are equal to one. In the sample, the Herfindahl Index 
ranges from 0.22 to 1.00, with a mean value of 0.92. In Table 2.4, Panel A, columns 1 
and 3 show that when the level of diversification is higher, the mutual fund ownership 
is lower. However, one may think that the positive coefficients are driven by the 
organizational form instead of the level of diversification. To address this concern, we 
test the effect of diversification in a subsample of conglomerates in columns 2 and 4. 
The results show that the incremental increase of diversification correlates with a lower 
level of mutual fund ownership. 
Next, we propose another measure of firm diversification. Instead of using 3-digit SIC 
code, we use 1-digit SIC code or 2-digit SIC code to define conglomerates4. We define 
a firm as a pureplay if it operates in only one 1-digit SIC industry; otherwise, it is 
defined as a conglomerate. In this case, we can mitigate the limitation of 3-digit SIC 
codes being too narrow or firms mistakenly report their industry. Besides, under the 
new definition, the segments of a conglomerate are less correlated. According to the 
first prediction, we expect to see that mutual funds prefer pure-play firms, and the 
magnitude is larger than that under the definition using 3-digit SIC code. We report the 
results in Panel B. The coefficient increases from 0.596 in column 1 to 1.012 in column 
3, confirming that mutual funds prefer pure-play firms that are more focused. 
To test the second prediction, we place mutual funds into groups based on their industry 
concentration levels. We use the Industry Concentration Index (ICI) measure proposed 
by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) to quantify the extent of portfolio 
concentration in 10 broadly defined industries. We use the primary SIC code of firms 
to find the corresponding 10 industries. This index is a proxy of how much a mutual 
fund’s holding deviates from the market portfolio. The Industry Concentration Index at 
time t for a mutual fund is defined as the sum of the squared deviations of the value 
weights for each of the 10 different industries held by the mutual fund, Wj,t, relative to 
 
4 The first digit of the SIC code indicates the division, the first two digits indicate the major 
group, the first three digits indicate the industry group, and the fourth digit indicates the specific 
industry sector. 
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the industry weights of the total stock market, W� j, t: 
 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = ∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑊𝑊�𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡)210𝑗𝑗=1  (2.3) 
This index is equal to zero if a mutual fund has exactly the same industry composition 
as the market portfolio and increases as a mutual fund becomes more concentrated in 
fewer industries. The Industry Concentration Index is related to the Herfindahl index, 
which is commonly used in industrial organizations literature to measure the 
concentration of companies in an industry. The Industry Concentration Index can be 
thought of as a market-adjusted Herfindahl Index.5  
We then divide actively managed mutual funds into 5 quintiles in each quarter and 
calculate the ownership by mutual funds with different levels of industry concentration. 
For example, MFO_ICI1 is the percentage of shares held by mutual funds in the lowest 
quintile of industry concentration index in each quarter. We run regressions of mutual 
fund ownership on the PurePlay dummy and control variables, and the results are 
reported in Table 2.4, Panel C. The results show that the coefficients on the PurePlay 
dummy are insignificant in column 1 to 3, and significantly positive in the last two 
columns. It indicates that more concentrated mutual funds prefer pure-play firms more 
than less concentrated mutual funds, and the increase is monotonic. It is consistent with 
our second prediction and supports the industry expertise hypothesis. 
We further test Prediction 3 of the industry expertise. If a firm is affected by the industry 
factor to a higher degree, mutual funds should prefer that firm to take advantage of its 
expertise in that industry. To measure the industry betas of stocks, we follow Liu (2011) 
to run the following regression: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 ∗ �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 − ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2.4) 
where RtI is the return on the industry portfolio in day t for stock n’s industry. We 
exclude stock n when we construct the industry portfolio to prevent spurious 
correlations between firms and industry returns in industries with a small number of 
 
5 Because ICI is calculated using primary SIC codes of firms, ICI and holding of pureplays are 
not necessarily mechanically correlated. A mutual fund can hold only conglomerates but still 
have a high ICI if those conglomerates’ primary segments are in the same industry. 
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firms. We use the market value of stocks in day t–1 to calculate the weighted industry 
portfolio return. RtM is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index, and β�n
IM 
is the market beta of stock n’s industry, estimated from the following regression in each 
calendar year:  
 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼  (2.5) 
Industry R-squared measures the importance of market and industry movement relative 
to the idiosyncratic movement in determining stock returns. It is derived from the 
following regression: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 ∗ �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 − ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2.6) 
We then test the prediction that mutual fund ownership is higher in firms that are more 
sensitive to the industry factor, as measured by greater industry betas and higher values 
of industry R-squared statistics. The result in Table 2.4, Panel D supports our prediction. 
The coefficients on the Indbeta and IndRsq are positive, meaning that when firms are 
more affected by industry factors, the mutual fund ownership is higher. 
2.4.4 Other institutional investors 
The fractions of a stock held by mutual funds, other institutions, and retail investors 
must sum up to one. If the demand for organizational forms were identical among 
mutual funds and other investors, mutual fund ownership should be identical across 
conglomerates and pureplays. Section 4.3 shows that mutual funds’ advantage in 
industry expertise leads to their higher demand for pureplay firms. However, is it true 
that mutual funds have greater industry expertise even compared to other institutional 
investors such as hedge funds and pension funds? 
Table B.2 of the appendix reports the preference of hedge funds and other institutional 
investors for pure-play firms. We define other institutions as institutional investors 
excluding actively managed mutual funds and hedge funds. The baseline regressions 
and falsification tests in Panel A and Panel B show an insignificant and not robust 
preference. It means that the higher mutual fund ownership in pure-play firms is driven 
by mutual funds’ higher demand for pure-play firms compared to retail investors. 
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Results in Panel C and Panel D show that industry concentration of hedge fund holdings 
and other institutions holdings do not affect their demand for pure-play firms. Passive 
investors and indexers are possibly the reason why other institutional investors, on 
average, do not prefer pure-play firms. 
Hedge funds not showing industry expertise are possibly due to two reasons. First, 
hedge fund investments may require more firm-specific knowledge than industry-level 
knowledge. Brav, Jiang, Partnov, and Thomas (2008) find that hedge funds increasingly 
engage in shareholder activism. Because hedge funds are subjected to fewer regulations 
than mutual funds and pension funds, they can hold highly concentrated positions in 
fewer companies and influence corporate management and monitoring. Moreover, the 
13F filings only report long positions, which is a small part of hedge funds’ 12 
investment strategies6, as defined by Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2012). The 
top 4 strategies of hedge funds are long/short, multi-strategy, emerging markets, and 
commodity trading advisor (CTA). The number of hedge funds in the Long Only 
category accounts for 2% of their sample. Even for the Long/Short hedge funds, we do 
not know their long positions are simple buys or short-covering positions. Given the 
above information, industry expertise and organizational form may be a minor factor 
for hedge fund investments, and hedge funds do not show a preference for pure-play 
firms in their long positions. 
2.4.5 Mutual fund ownership around M&As 
To further identify organizational form’s effect on mutual fund investments, we 
examine the mutual fund ownerships around the change in organizational forms. We 
use firms in conglomerating mergers as the treated group and firms involved in non-
conglomerating mergers as the control group. This way, our analysis captures the 
within-firm effect and mitigates the concern that our results are driven by the time-
invariant firm-specific characteristics within each industry. Given that the M&As data 
 
6 The 12 strategies are: CTAs, Emerging markets, Event driven, Global macro, Long only, 
Long/short, Market Neutral, Multi-strategy, Relative value, Sector, Short bias, and others. 
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provide exact effective dates, and the mutual fund ownership data are at a quarterly 
frequency, we know in which quarter a conglomerating M&A took place. We can then 
introduce “event time dummies” as an indicator of the quarters relative to the treatment. 
In Figure 2.1, t+4 means that the sample includes the firm-quarter observations in the 
4th quarter after and before the M&A effective quarter (two observations for the M&A); 
t+5 indicates the firm-quarter observations in the 5th quarter before and after the M&A 
effective quarter, and so on. The regression model is shown below.  
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                 (2.7) 
where After is a dummy that equals one if it is after the M&A effective quarter and 0 
otherwise; Conglo M&A is a dummy that equals one if it is a conglomerating M&A. To 
be classified as a conglomerating M&A, we require that either the target firm or the 
acquiring firm to be a pure-play firm in the year before the M&A, and the merged firm 
is a conglomerate in the year after the M&A. Accordingly, the interaction term measures 
the effect of conglomerating M&As on the treated firm after the treatment. The M&A 
sample contains 22,518 observations, which includes 574 M&As in total and 32 
conglomerating M&As.   
Figure 2.1, Panel A plots the coefficients and the confidence intervals on the interaction 
term using various periods around the M&As. The coefficients become significantly 
negative when we use observations 6 and 7 quarters before and after the M&A. This 
finding shows that conglomerating M&As do affect the mutual fund ownership, but it 
takes time for mutual funds to react to the change in organizational form. The decrease 
of the institutional ownership occurs more than one year after the treatment.7 
Next, we check the industry expertise hypothesis by examining how much of the mutual 
fund ownership change around conglomerating M&A is due to the change in 
diversification. We start by creating a dummy HHI drop that equals one if the change 
of Herfindahl index of sales around the M&A is smaller or equal to zero. Then we 
 
7 In untabulated robustness tests, we define conglomerates using 1-digit or 2-digit SIC codes, 
the decrease of MFO occurs in the 4th quarter after conglomerating M&As, and the magnitude 
is similar. It is consistent with our hypothesis that conglomerates have less mutual fund 
ownership when they are more diversified. 
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include interaction terms After * Conglo M&A * HHI drop and After * Conglo M&A * 
(1 - HHI drop) in the regressions. This difference-in-difference-in-differences 
specification and allows us to disentangle the effect coming from the change of firm 
diversification. As shown in Figure 2.1, Panel B, the coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant on After * Conglo M&A * HHI drop starting the 6th quarter. In 
contrast, the coefficients in Panel C on After * Conglo M&A * (1 – HHI drop) are 
insignificant, meaning that the change of diversification explains the change of mutual 
fund ownership around conglomerating M&As. The result in Figure 2.1 alleviates the 
concerns that our findings are driving by firm heterogeneity within industries and offer 
another piece of evidence that supports the industry expertise hypothesis.  
2.5 Fund Level Analysis 
Results in section 4 show that actively managed equity mutual funds, especially the 
ones with industry expertise, have a significant preference for pure-play firms. The next 
question is whether mutual funds benefit from the industry expertise by holding more 
pure-play firms. We construct a new variable, Pureplayness, that measures the share of 
total net assets invested in pure-play firms. We define it as:  
 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ∑ (𝑤𝑤j × 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  (2.8) 
where wj is the portfolio weight of asset j in the fund, and Pureplayj is a dummy that 
equals one for pure-play firms.8  
Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics on fund characteristics. The sample is from 
2003 to 2015 and includes 62,062 fund-quarter observations and 1,928 unique funds. 
The average fund has a Pureplayness of 0.617, meaning that an average mutual fund 
invests 61.7% of its equity in pure-play firms. There is dispersion in Pureplayness 
 
8 Previous literature using Compustat’s segment files usually drop firms if the sum of the 
segment sales deviate more than 1% from the total net sales of the firm (Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Seru, 2014). This filter removes 1/3 firm-year observations, and thus many mutual fund 
holdings cannot be matched to the segment file, and it leads to an imprecise measure of 
Pureplayness. Therefore, we ignore this sales filter and define a firm as conglomerate as long 
as it reports more than 1 segment. Firms have little incentive to report a segment with no 
business activity in it.  
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among funds. The Pureplayness ranges from 0.345 to 0.897, and the standard deviation 
is 0.115.  
2.5.1 Persistence of the Pureplayness 
If Pureplayness is causing the deviation in a fund’s returns from its peers, funds should 
exhibit relatively persistent Pureplayness over time. For example, if a fund displays 
high Pureplayness due to the manager’s deep understanding of an industry or her ability 
to select outperforming industries, its Pureplayness will likely to remain high in the 
future, no matter the manager continues to invest in the same industry or switch to 
another industry. 
To exam whether the Pureplayness is persistent, we sort all funds into quintile portfolios 
by a fund’s average Pureplayness in the previous 8 quarters. We then calculate the 
average Pureplayness in each quintile in the current quarter, subsequent one quarter, 
two quarters, and one to three years. Since we use data in the past to construct portfolios 
and calculate Pureplayness based on all funds that exist in the future, there is no look-
ahead bias. Table 2.6 reports the results. The future Pureplayness of the high-
Pureplayness portfolio remains higher than that of the low-Pureplayness portfolio in 
all time horizons. The gap between the high and low portfolio shrinks over time but 
remains significant after three years. The results indicate a persistent Pureplayness 
index. 
2.5.2 Determinants of the Pureplayness 
To explain the cross-sectional variation of Pureplayness, we run a panel regression of 
Pureplayness on a variety of explanatory variables. We use turnover, expense ratio, the 
number of stocks, and whether a fund is team-managed as explanatory variables, as 
they are under managers’ direct control and endogenous to the dependent variable. The 
control variables also include fund size, fund age, previous fund returns, and net inflows. 
Since the dependent variable is persistent within funds, we include time fixed effects 
but not fund fixed effects. Since funds with different styles might have a different 
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preference for pure-play firms, we also include fund style fixed effects 9 . Because 
Pureplayness and many independent variables are persistent over time, we cluster 
standard errors by fund and time.  
Table 2.7 reports the results. Turnover, expense, and the number of stocks are all 
positively related to Pureplayness, indicating that active managing style partly explains 
the holding of pure-play firms. Fund size and fund age are positively related to 
Pureplayness, meaning larger funds invest more in pure-play firms. Team manager does 
not explain Pureplayness. It is not surprising because team members are self-selected. 
Past returns and past inflows have little explanation power of Pureplayness. In column 
4, we include the lagged Industry Concentration Index (ICI) as an independent variable. 
It is consistent with the hypothesis that Pureplayness and ICI both capture the fund’s 
industry expertise. We will carefully control for ICI in the following fund performance 
analysis. Overall, the multivariate regressions show that Pureplayness is not easily 
explained by other fund characteristics. 
2.5.3 Fund performance and the Pureplayness 
We have provided evidence that Pureplayness potentially captures the fund’s industry 
expertise, and common fund characteristics cannot fully explain it. In this section, we 
test whether Pureplayness contains valuable information and can be used to predict 
future returns. We then discuss its difference from the Industry Concentration Index 
constructed by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005).  
We first explore the performance of funds with low and high Pureplayness by sorting 
funds into portfolios based on their past Pureplayness. At the beginning of each quarter, 
we sort funds into quintiles based on Pureplayness calculated using the previous 
quarter’s holdings. The low-Pureplayness portfolio includes the 20% of mutual funds 
in the sample with the lowest share invested in pure-play firms in the prior quarter. The 
high-Pureplayness portfolio consists of 20% of mutual funds in the sample with the 
 
9 We use CRSP mutual fund style and objective codes. The six major fund styles are growth, 
growth and income, income, mid-cap, small-cap, and micro-cap. 
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highest percentage invested in pure-play firms in the previous quarter. For each 
portfolio, we compute the value-weighted average buy-and-hold before-fee returns for 
the subsequent quarter. The quintile portfolios are rebalanced every quarter. Since 
portfolios are created using data in the previous quarter, we lose observations of the 
first three months. The final sample period is from April 2003 to December 2015. 
Considering that the difference in returns between the low-Pureplayness and high-
Pureplayness funds could be explained by well-known market anomalies, we adjust the 
returns and report the Fama-French-Carhart six-factor alpha and factor exposures for 
the low and high Pureplayness portfolios. Table 2.8, Panel A shows that the low-
Pureplayness portfolio has an annualized alpha of 0.481%, and the high-Pureplayness 
portfolio has an annualized alpha of 2.18%. The difference in alpha between the two 
portfolios is 1.7% per year and significant at 5% level10. High-Pureplayness funds tend 
to hold smaller, growth stocks, stocks with weak operating profitability, and stocks with 
aggressive investments.  
The return predicting power of Pureplayness may be explained by the Industry 
Concentration Index (ICI) since these two indices are positively correlated and both 
measure industry expertise. To rule out this concern, we perform the double-sort test. 
Each quarter we sort funds first into ICI quintiles, and then within each ICI quintile, 
funds are further sorted into Pureplayness quintiles. We compute the value-weighted 
average return within each of the twenty-five portfolios and then compute six-factor 
alpha of each portfolio using monthly time-series data. Result in Panel B shows that 
within each of the five quintiles of ICI, high-Pureplayness portfolios always outperform 
low-Pureplayness portfolios, and the difference is statistically significant in three ICI 
quintiles. Pureplayness improves fund performance after controlling for ICI.  
Another concern is that the predictive power of Pureplayness may simply be a 
consequence of the positive relationship between Pureplayness and other fund 
characteristics. To isolate Pureplayness from other fund characteristics, we estimate the 
following panel regression: 
 
10 The difference of alpha between the high and low Pureplayness portfolios are quantitatively 
similar when we use after-fee mutual fund returns.  
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 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
                           + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (2.9) 
The independent variables include Pureplayness, ICI, total net assets in the prior quarter, 
turnover, expense ratio, fund age at the end of the previous year, and net inflow in the 
previous twelve months. We include fund style fixed effects and year-quarter fixed 
effects. Because returns are highly correlated across funds and within funds, we cluster 
the standard errors by fund and time. We use four different measures of fund 
performance: six-factor alpha, industry selectivity, industry timing, and industry-
adjusted stock selectivity. Industry selectivity measures a fund’s ability to select 
industries that generate positive returns; industry timing measures a fund’s ability to 
generate additional returns by exploiting time-varying returns of industries; industry-
adjusted stock selectivity measures a fund’s ability to pick stocks that outperform peers 
within industries (Daniel, et al., 1997; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005). They are 
defined as: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = ∑ [𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−3 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗, 𝑛𝑛 − 3)]𝑗𝑗  (2.10) 
 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = ∑ [𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−3𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗, 𝑛𝑛 − 3) − 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−6𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗, 𝑛𝑛 − 6)]𝑗𝑗  (2.11) 
 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−3[𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗, 𝑛𝑛 − 3)]𝑗𝑗  (2.12) 
where IRt(j, t-3) is the value-weighted industry return in month t, to which stock j was 
allocated at the end of the prior quarter. The variable wj, t-3 is the share invested in stock 
j at the end of the prior quarter, Rj, t is the return of stock j in month t. Since these three 
measures are adjusted only by industry but not by other common market anomalies, we 
regress them on the Fama-French-Carhart six-factor model to obtain risk-adjusted 
industry selectivity, industry timing, and stock selectivity.   
Panel regression results are reported in Table 2.9. In column 1, where the dependent 
variable is six-factor alpha, the coefficient is significantly positive for Pureplayness 
after controlling for ICI. The coefficients on both variables are positive and significant 
in column 2. It suggests that Pureplayness and ICI are not perfectly correlated, and 
Pureplayness can predict future industry selectivity. Results in columns 3 and 4 show 
that Pureplayness can predict industry timing ability but not stock selectivity. Overall, 
the results suggest that Pureplayness predicts returns by picking and timing industry, 
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and it displays little stock-picking skill. The findings are consistent with our hypothesis 
that Pureplayness captures funds industry expertise11.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of corporate diversification on mutual fund investments. 
We find that mutual funds have a preference for pure-play firms and invest 1.029% 
more in them. What’s more, after a pure-play firm merges into a conglomerate, the 
mutual fund ownership decreases afterward. We also show that firm diversification and 
the industry expertise of mutual funds explain the preference for pure-play firms. When 
a firm is more diversified, or the stock price is more affected by the industry factor, or 
mutual funds have higher industry concentration, mutual fund ownership is higher. 
This paper also joins the long-standing debate on whether active mutual fund managers 
have skills and generate value for investors. Consistent with Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2005), we find that mutual fund managers possess industry expertise and exploit 
the industry expertise by investing more in pure-play firms. Funds with more assets in 
pure-play firms perform better than other funds. The results are robust after controlling 
for other industry expertise measures, adjusting risks using the Fama-French-Carhart 
six-factor model, and dissecting returns into industry selecting ability and industry 
timing ability.
 
11 In untabulated tests, we find that risk-adjusted returns are higher for conglomerates than 
pure-play firms during the sample period, but the difference is insignificant. Therefore, the 
better performance of high Pureplayness funds cannot be simply explained by higher alpha of 
pure-play firms. 
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2.7 Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
The sample is from 2003 to 2015 and includes 107,501 firm-quarter observations, 4,783 
unique firms and of which 1,159 are conglomerates. We calculate the mean values of 
the variables in each quarter and then report the quarterly average across time in Panel 
A and correlations in Panel B. The last column in Panel A reports the t value for the 
paired t-tests of the differences between conglomerates and pure-play firms. Mutual 
fund ownership, MFO, is defined as the percentage of shares outstanding that are held 
by mutual funds. Other variables are defined in Table B.1. 
 
Panel A: Difference in variables between conglomerates and pureplays 
 Conglo PurePlay Diff t-value 
Mutual fund ownership  8.148 7.540 0.609 7.234 
Market cap 3089.651 1915.452 1174.199 8.991 
Stock return 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.404 
Dividend yield 0.025 0.016 0.009 13.445 
Return volatility 0.119 0.145 -0.026 -16.208 
M/B 1.364 1.996 -0.631 -18.357 
Leverage 0.225 0.171 0.054 16.628 
Price 26.407 19.072 7.335 10.528 
Firm age 23.422 13.941 9.481 20.192 
S&P 500 0.124 0.067 0.057 19.020 
ROA 0.010 -0.070 0.080 19.080 
Stock turnover 4.682 5.398 -0.716 -9.773 
Spread 0.010 0.012 -0.001 -4.228 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
Mutual fund 
ownership 
Market 
cap 
Stock 
return 
Dividend 
yield 
Return 
volatility M/B Leverage Price Firm age S&P 500 ROA 
Stock 
turnover 
Market cap 0.629            
Stock return 0.204 0.086           
Dividend yield 0.174 0.368 -0.024          
Return volatility -0.340 -0.125 -0.013 0.619         
M/B 0.187 0.570 0.084 0.543 0.533        
Leverage -0.158 0.111 -0.147 0.864 0.887 0.571       
Price 0.538 0.903 0.002 0.615 0.105 0.708 0.393      
Firm age 0.404 0.603 0.007 0.781 0.585 0.852 0.741 0.775     
S&P 500 0.429 0.671 0.031 0.768 0.562 0.810 0.720 0.791 0.978    
ROA 0.576 0.162 0.225 -0.585 -0.830 -0.345 -0.838 -0.083 -0.350 -0.318   
Stock turnover 0.537 0.605 0.031 0.653 0.409 0.816 0.565 0.777 0.890 0.846 -0.209  
Spread -0.585 -0.307 -0.176 0.557 0.874 0.299 0.841 -0.045 0.339 0.303 -0.932 0.157 
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Table 2.2: Effects of organizational form on mutual fund ownership 
The sample contains 107,501 firm-quarter observations in the period of 2003 to 2015, 
of which 86,215 observations are pure-play firms. This table reports regressions of the 
actively managed mutual fund ownership (MFO) on the organizational form (PurePlay) 
and control variables. Mutual fund ownership, MFO, is defined as the percentage of 
shares outstanding that are held by mutual funds. PurePlay is the organizational form 
dummy, which equals one if the firm is a pure-play firm (operates in one industry), and 
zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table B.1. This table reports the 
coefficients from pooled OLS regressions with year-quarter fixed effects and Fama-
French 48 industry fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for the clustering of 
observations at the firm and quarter level. T-stats are given in brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MFO MFO MFO MFO MFO 
           
PurePlay -0.680** 0.654*** 0.652*** 0.596** 0.615** 
 (-2.415) (2.733) (2.814) (2.599) (2.609) 
Ln(Mkt cap)  1.668*** 1.057*** 1.093*** 1.090*** 
  (13.32) (8.117) (9.886) (9.625) 
Stock return  -0.815** -0.826** -0.768** -0.566 
  (-2.549) (-2.258) (-2.110) (-1.612) 
Dividend yield  -8.840*** -11.53*** -11.74*** -11.96*** 
  (-6.276) (-7.206) (-7.069) (-6.954) 
Return volatility  -6.619*** -2.227** -4.933*** -5.910*** 
  (-6.145) (-2.445) (-4.236) (-4.630) 
M/B   0.00328 -0.0226 0.000669 
   (0.0457) (-0.313) (0.00894) 
Leverage   -0.406 -0.795* -0.776* 
   (-0.916) (-1.850) (-1.743) 
Ln(Price)   2.628*** 2.550*** 2.576*** 
   (11.68) (12.09) (12.22) 
Ln(Firm age)   0.100 0.142 0.131 
   (0.736) (1.048) (0.940) 
S&P 500   -5.468*** -5.724*** -5.810*** 
   (-9.342) (-11.03) (-10.97) 
ROA   -1.297*** -1.161*** -1.252*** 
   (-5.391) (-5.028) (-5.112) 
Stock turnover    0.134***  
    (6.771)  
Spread    26.27***  
    (3.002)  
      
 
  
60 
 
Table 2.2 (continued) 
 
Lag(Stock turnover)     0.138*** 
     (6.740) 
Lag(Spread)     22.04** 
     (2.476) 
      
Observations 107,501 99,464 97,077 96,991 93,322 
R-squared 0.001 0.360 0.416 0.423 0.420 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.3: Falsification tests 
This table provides falsification tests of the effect of conglomeration on mutual fund 
ownership. The dependent variable is the mutual fund ownership (MFO), as defined in 
Table B.1. The key variable is the Actual dummy for the actual conglomerate. The 
sample consists of actual conglomerates and pseudo-conglomerates. To construct 
pseudo-conglomerates, for each segment of an actual conglomerate, we select a single-
segment firm in the segment’s industry with the closest value of book assets (sales, 
operating profit, or imputed market size) in the year when the conglomerate first 
appears in our sample. The pseudo-conglomerate spans the same portfolio of industries 
as an actual conglomerate. The variables for pseudo-conglomerates are based on book-
value weighted variables of each single-segment firm. All the regressions control for 
firm fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and quarter.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 
Matched by 
Total Assets 
Matched by 
Sales 
Matched by 
Operating Profit 
Matched by 
Imputed Market Cap 
 
Actual -1.029*** -0.942*** -0.801** -0.648*  
 (-3.265) (-2.997) (-2.519) (-1.972)  
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 26,331 27,044 26,477 26,257  
R-squared 0.623 0.610 0.603 0.597  
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
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Table 2.4: Mutual fund ownership, firm diversification, and industry expertise 
This table reports the results of regressions of mutual fund ownership on various 
measures of firm diversification. The sample includes quarterly data from 2003 to 2015. 
The dependent variable is the actively managed mutual fund ownership. In Panel A, 
Ln(#Segments + 1) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of segments of a 
firm. Herfindahl index of a firm is calculated using the sales of various segments in the 
firm. In Panel B, a firm is defined as a conglomerate if it operates in more than one 
segment with a different 3-digit SIC code, or 2-digit SIC code, or 1-digit SIC code. A 
PurePaly dummy that equals one is assigned to firms that are not conglomerates, and 
zero for conglomerates. In Panel C, we divide mutual funds into 5 quintiles by their 
Industry Concentration Index (ICI). E.g., MFO_ICI1 is the mutual fund ownership held 
by mutual funds that are in the lowest quintile of industry concentration in quarter t. 
MFO_ICI5 is the ownership held by mutual funds with the highest industry 
concentration (expertise). In panel D, we create industry beta and industry R-squared 
to measure how much a firm is affected by the industry factor. Other control variables 
are defined and listed in Table 2.1. All standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. 
 
Panel A: Mutual fund ownership and firm diversification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
MFO 
 
Full sample 
MFO 
Subsample of 
Conglomerates 
MFO 
 
Full sample 
MFO 
Subsample of 
Conglomerates 
        
Ln(#Segments + 1) -1.487*** -3.410***   
 (-3.603) (-3.661)   
Herfindahl Index   1.215** 0.102 
   (2.208) (0.104) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,790 19,661 96,790 19,661 
R-squared 0.424 0.434 0.423 0.429 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Alternative definition of conglomerates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 MFO MFO MFO 
        
PurePlay SIC3 0.596**   
 (2.599)   
PurePlay SIC2  0.687***  
  (2.801)  
PurePlay SIC1   1.021*** 
   (3.541) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,991 96,309 96,386 
R-squared 0.423 0.424 0.424 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel C: Industry expertise of mutual funds and firm diversification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MFO_ICI1 MFO_ICI2 MFO_ICI3 MFO_ICI4 MFO_ICI5 
            
PurePlay 0.0101 0.0655 0.124 0.187** 0.214*** 
 (0.299) (1.051) (1.464) (2.530) (3.317) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 
R-squared 0.233 0.213 0.233 0.263 0.208 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel D: Industry beta, industry R-squared and MFO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MFO MFO MFO MFO 
          
PurePlay  0.583**  0.639*** 
  (2.551)  (2.779) 
IndBeta 1.071*** 1.045***   
 (6.065) (5.943)   
IndRsq   1.074 0.946 
   (0.810) (0.714) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,789 95,789 95,789 95,789 
R-squared 0.426 0.426 0.423 0.424 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.5: Fund level summary statistics 
This table summarizes the characteristics of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. 
The sample includes fund-quarter level observations from 2003 to 2015, with 1,928 
unique funds. The Pureplayness is defined as 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  ∑(𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗), 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 is the portfolio weight of stock j in the fund, and Pureplay is a dummy that 
equals one for pure-play firms, and zero for conglomerates. Other variables are defined 
in Table B.1. 
 
  Mean Median Min Max Std N 
       
Pureplayness 0.617 0.615 0.345 0.897 0.115 62,062 
ICI 0.067 0.057 0.015 0.266 0.043 62,062 
Fund turnover 0.763 0.610 0.040 3.170 0.601 62,062 
Expense 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.022 0.003 62,062 
Fund size 5.783 5.739 2.092 9.756 1.678 62,062 
Fund size2 36.256 32.934 4.376 95.175 19.998 62,062 
#Stocks 64.818 49.000 11.000 365.000 57.405 62,062 
Fund age 16.402 13.000 1.000 56.000 10.986 62,062 
Team 0.694 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.461 62,062 
Net inflow (3m) 0.001 -0.017 -0.240 0.514 0.109 62,062 
Net inflow (1yr) 0.024 -0.047 -0.606 1.400 0.327 62,062 
Fund return (3m) 1.152 1.183 0.334 1.870 0.334 62,062 
Fund return (1yr) 1.091 1.106 0.537 1.675 0.238 62,062 
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Table 2.6: Persistence of the Pureplayness 
This table reports the time-series means of the average Pureplayness for the current 
quarter and the subsequent three months, six months, and one to three years for each of 
the quintile portfolios sorted on the previous 8-quarter Pureplayness. It also reports the 
difference between the 1st and 5th quintile. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Time 0 3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 
       
Low Pureplayness 0.491 0.499 0.506 0.515 0.528 0.541 
2 0.563 0.565 0.568 0.572 0.579 0.588 
3 0.613 0.613 0.613 0.612 0.616 0.621 
4 0.667 0.665 0.665 0.664 0.660 0.662 
High Pureplayness 0.754 0.748 0.744 0.738 0.730 0.728 
Hi - Lo 0.262*** 0.249*** 0.239*** 0.223*** 0.202*** 0.187*** 
(t-stat) (250) (220) (200) (170) (130) (110) 
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Table 2.7: Determinants of the Pureplayness 
The dependent variable is Pureplayness for each fund-quarter observation. Fund size is 
the natural logarithm of end-of-quarter total net assets. Fund return is the raw return in 
the previous 3 months or 1 year. Fund age is fund age measured by years. Team 
managed is a dummy that equals one for funds that are managed by two or more 
managers. Other variables are defined in Table B.1. Time fixed effects and fund style 
fixed effects are included in all specifications. The t-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered by fund and year-quarter. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pureplayness Pureplayness Pureplayness Pureplayness 
          
Fund size 0.00334*** 0.00332*** 0.00201* 0.00170 
 (2.937) (2.931) (1.674) (1.460) 
Fund turnover 0.0195*** 0.0196*** 0.0190*** 0.0209*** 
 (6.677) (6.639) (6.393) (7.252) 
Expense 3.164*** 3.175*** 3.253*** 2.773*** 
 (5.674) (5.702) (5.762) (5.048) 
Fund return (3m)  0.0109 0.00997 0.00495 
  (0.417) (0.387) (0.197) 
Fund return (1yr)  0.0135 0.0194 0.0194 
  (0.330) (0.469) (0.504) 
#Stocks   4.23e-05 0.000103*** 
   (1.374) (3.266) 
Fund age   0.000440** 0.000461** 
   (2.480) (2.655) 
Team managed   -0.000163 0.00111 
   (-0.0529) (0.368) 
Net inflow (3m)   -0.000269 -2.11e-05 
   (-0.0205) (-0.00167) 
Net inflow (1yr)   -0.00386 -0.00451 
   (-0.818) (-0.984) 
ICI    0.359*** 
    (8.717) 
     
Observations 61,314 61,314 61,314 61,314 
R-squared 0.266 0.267 0.269 0.284 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.8: Quintile portfolios - Factor-based performance measures 
The sample includes monthly value-weighted portfolio returns from April 2003 to 
December 2015. The table reports the portfolio alphas and factor loadings using the 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model plus the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. 
In Panel A, actively managed equity funds are sorted into quintiles based on their 
Pureplayness in the previous quarter. In Panel B, funds are sorted into quintiles first 
based on their Industry Concentration Index (ICI), and then within each quintile, funds 
are sorted based on their Pureplayness in the previous quarter. The portfolios are 
rebalanced quarterly, and the alphas are annualized. The standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on Pureplayness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Low 
Pureplayness 2 3 4 
High 
Pureplayness Hi - Lo 
             
Market 0.989*** 1.011*** 1.006*** 1.009*** 0.993*** 0.00369 
 (76.38) (66.43) (84.99) (76.19) (61.75) (0.202) 
Size -0.0224 0.0569*** 0.185*** 0.270*** 0.378*** 0.401*** 
 (-1.243) (2.797) (11.62) (12.56) (13.38) (12.23) 
Value 0.0337 -0.0112 -0.0308 -0.138*** -0.182*** -0.215*** 
 (1.281) (-0.404) (-1.430) (-4.806) (-7.234) (-6.768) 
Momentum -0.0178* -0.0227* 0.000536 0.0207 0.00776 0.0255 
 (-1.896) (-1.773) (0.0527) (1.420) (0.441) (1.643) 
Profitability 0.00830 0.0341 0.0182 -0.0638** -0.146*** -0.155*** 
 (0.343) (1.293) (0.747) (-2.018) (-3.809) (-3.817) 
Investment -0.0339 -0.0749*** -0.140*** -0.147*** -0.245*** -0.211*** 
 (-1.030) (-3.120) (-5.168) (-4.115) (-5.657) (-4.153) 
Alpha 0.00481 -0.00386 -0.00291 0.0162*** 0.0218*** 0.0170** 
 (1.043) (-0.807) (-0.723) (2.950) (3.318) (2.261) 
       
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R-squared 0.990 0.991 0.992 0.987 0.981 0.710 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
Panel B: Double-sorted portfolios 
  
Low 
Pureplayness 2 3 4 
High 
Pureplayness Hi - Lo 
Low ICI 0.00480 -0.00223 -0.00946** 0.00315 0.0218*** 0.0170** 
 (1.126) (-0.489) (-2.338) (0.669) (2.796) (2.411) 
2 -0.00152 -0.00680 0.000697 0.0216*** 0.0166* 0.0181* 
 (-0.251) (-1.225) (0.115) (3.054) (1.868) (1.898) 
3 0.00696 0.00490 -0.00111 0.0176** 0.0128 0.00581 
 (1.408) (0.640) (-0.163) (2.414) (1.498) (0.553) 
4 0.00744 -0.00312 -0.00253 0.0134* 0.0312*** 0.0238** 
 (1.223) (-0.490) (-0.380) (1.861) (3.787) (2.416) 
High ICI 0.00582 -0.00307 -0.00358 0.0228*** 0.0199** 0.0140 
  (0.662) (-0.390) (-0.563) (2.915) (2.322) (1.162) 
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Table 2.9: Pureplayness and alternative risk adjustments 
This table reports the coefficients of the panel regression of fund performance measures 
on fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the Fama-French-Carhart six-factor 
alpha in column 1, and the industry selectivity measure in column 2, the industry timing 
measure in column 3, and the industry-adjusted stock selectivity measure in column 4. 
All independent variables are lagged by one quarter relative to the dependent variable. 
The definition of variables is available in Table B.1. The standard errors are clustered 
by fund and time and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Six-factor Alpha Industry Selectivity Industry Timing Stock Selectivity 
         
Pureplayness 0.0607** 0.0585*** 0.00861* 0.0250 
 (2.324) (3.119) (1.844) (0.737) 
ICI -0.00247 0.0666** 0.0115 -0.0276 
 (-0.0888) (2.220) (1.174) (-0.505) 
Fund turnover -0.000327 0.00241* 6.79e-05 0.00409 
 (-0.0739) (1.720) (0.0657) (1.144) 
Expense -0.256 0.00344 0.00947 0.593 
 (-0.595) (0.0135) (0.102) (1.416) 
Fund size -0.00103 -0.000466 0.000199 0.000723 
 (-0.930) (-0.846) (1.177) (0.991) 
Fund age 0.000227** 4.49e-05 -4.84e-05* 5.60e-05 
 (2.183) (0.886) (-1.783) (0.621) 
Net inflow (1yr) 0.00353 -0.00175 -6.03e-08 0.00643 
 (0.630) (-0.792) (-5.96e-05) (1.527) 
     
Observations 46,155 46,155 46,155 46,155 
R-squared 0.093 0.332 0.144 0.071 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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2.8 Figures 
Figure 2.1: Mutual fund ownership and firm diversification around M&As 
This figure presents the dynamics in mutual fund ownership in the quarters around the 
conglomerating M&As. The estimation is from the following specification: 
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
The After dummy equals one if it is after the M&A effective quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Conglo M&A is a dummy that indicates it is a conglomerating M&A, which requires 
the target and acquire have different primary 3-digit SIC code, and at least one of them 
is a pure-play firm before the M&A. In each model, we include one quarter before and 
one quarter after the M&A. E.g. [t+4] plots the coefficient when we include the fourth 
quarter before and the fourth quarter after the M&A. We plot β2 and the 95% confidence 
intervals in Panel A. We estimate the following specification and plot the coefficients 
in Panel B and Panel C: 
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × (1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
The HHI drop dummy equals one if the change of the Herfindahl index of segment sales 
around the M&A is below or equal to zero, i.e., the firm becomes more diversified. We 
plot the β2 and β3 coefficients and 95% confidence intervals in Panel B and Panel C, 
respectively. All the regressions control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. T-
values are clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Conglomerating M&As 
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Panel B: Conglomerating M&As – segment sales diversified 
 
 
Panel C: Conglomerating M&As – segment sales not diversified 
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Chapter 3 Can Mergers and Acquisitions Internalize Positive Externalities in 
Funding Innovation? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Technological innovation is a key driver of economic growth. However, several 
important innovations that, if successful, may lead to significant changes in how an 
industry or a sector of the economy operates, involve huge upfront costs. At the same 
time, their benefits may be spread across various sectors of society, such that the value 
of these benefits is not likely to be fully appropriable by the innovating firm alone. We 
will refer to such innovations as “fundamental innovations” in this paper. The positive 
externalities of fundamental innovations may cause individual firms to underinvest in 
developing such innovations. For example, Netflix, Inc. may work on a more efficient 
way of streaming high definition videos. If the technology is successfully developed, it 
can be used not only by Netflix for streaming its own content to its subscribers but may 
also help other companies in the industry or even outside the industry. For example, 
users may be likely to use this new technology to share videos on their Facebook pages 
and generate more website traffic for Facebook. While Netflix can benefit from 
charging royalties on direct usage of its patents, the spillover effects to Facebook or 
other companies may be hard for Netflix to appropriate fully. Therefore, the innovation 
producer (Netflix, in this example) may underinvest in the research and development 
(R&D) required for developing this more efficient video-streaming technology.1 
Bayar, Chemmanur, and Liu (2019) theoretically analyze the implication of the above 
idea and show that venture capitalists can help mitigate the underinvestment in such 
fundamental innovations by internalizing the positive externalities from innovation by 
 
1 The positive externalities driven by knowledge spillovers are known to be large in magnitude 
and are discussed by Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen (2006) and Bloom, Schankerman, and 
Van Reenen (2013). They show that the social rate of return to R&D are more than two times 
higher than the private return, indicating an under-investment of R&D compared to the socially 
optimal level. 
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investing in firms in upstream and downstream industries. 2  In this paper, we 
empirically analyze a different mechanism to address the above problem, namely, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We test whether M&As can internalize the positive 
externalities by merging firms from both the user industries and the producer industries 
of an innovation. After the merger or acquisition, the combined firm can capture the 
benefits associated with the innovation in both user industries and producer industries. 
Therefore, the combined firm should have greater incentives to fund innovation and file 
more patents. 
The notion that innovative activities are difficult to finance in a freely competitive 
marketplace has been around for a long time, and this is a typical positive externality 
problem analyzed in economics. 3  Economists have realized that the market can 
sometimes (at least partly) internalize the positive externality. For example, beekeepers 
can collect honey from their hives, but the bees will also pollinate surrounding fields 
and thus aid farmers. If the beehives and fields are owned separately, the number of 
beehives may be lower than the socially optimal level. However, if the farmer also owns 
beehives, he or she will increase the number of beehives. Similarly, by funding firms 
from both the user industries and the producer industries of innovation, the combined 
firm has incentives to increase the innovation because it will capture a higher proportion 
of the benefits of the innovation than it would otherwise. However, empirical tests of 
solutions to this problem are much rarer in the literature. Our paper aims to fill this gap. 
 
2 Another example of a fundamental innovation provided by Bayar, Chemmanur, and Liu 
(2018) is the development of a new battery that can store electrical energy in a much more 
efficient way. While an electric car manufacturer such as Tesla may invest significant amounts 
in developing this innovation (and benefit from it if the battery development is successful), the 
benefits from the development of this innovation may spill over to not only other electric auto-
manufacturers, but to many other sectors of the world economy (such as solar or wind powered 
electricity generating companies and any other industry that can benefit from the more efficient 
storage of electric energy). This means that individual firms like Tesla may currently be 
underinvesting in developing this fundamental innovation. 
3 The discussion perhaps starts with the classic articles of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962). 
Even in the presence of various mechanisms to increase appropriability such as patents and 
other forms of intellectual property protection, the underinvestment may not completely go 
away. For example, Mazzucato (2015) points out that fundamental innovations underlying such 
popular products as the iPod and iPhone manufactured by Apple, and Google’s search algorithm, 
were funded by U.S. government in various ways (e.g., through agencies such as DARPA or 
the National Science Foundation).  
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Empirically, we test this hypothesis by using two datasets: M&As from the Thomson 
Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum, which contains data on how firms 
merge, and a US patent and citation dataset, which contains data on firms that file the 
patents and citations received by the patents. We start by defining the upstream 
(innovation-producing) and downstream (innovation-using) firms for each industry 
using the patent citation dataset. If patents filed by firms from one industry are most 
cited by another industry in the previous 10 years, we define the former industry as the 
upstream industry and latter industry as the downstream industry. Firms in the upstream 
industry are the innovation producers, while firms in the downstream industry are the 
innovation users. We then show that after a merger between firms in upstream and 
downstream industries (i.e., both producers and users of an innovation), the combined 
firm becomes more innovative compared to the case where the two firms remain 
separate. We use various measures of innovation that are used in the literature. 
Bena and Li (2014) ask a related question of how M&As affect innovation and find that 
if two firms share the same innovation knowledge base, the combined firm after the 
merger is more productive compared to the case where the two firms remain separate. 
One drawback of their result comes from the firm-level data. The acquiring firm and 
the target firm may both file patents in multiply technological classes in the year before 
the merger, but not all the technological classes of the acquirer are affected by this 
merger. The synergy of innovation-related mergers and the increase of innovation 
output should mainly come from the targeted technological classes that are in a user-
producer relationship with the target firm’s R&D. Our paper, therefore, takes a different 
approach to this problem, as we discuss below. 
To better pin down the effect of mergers on patents, we further construct a firm tech-
class level dataset. Instead of providing associated SIC codes in patent documents, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) assigns patents to three-digit 
technological classes that are based on technology categorization instead of final 
product categorization. Because targets in about 90% of the M&A deals are private 
firms, their patent and technological class data are unavailable in our dataset. Therefore, 
in this setting, we know the technological classes of the acquirers and the industries of 
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the targets. Similar to the industry-to-industry relationship, we define an industry-to-
technological-class relationship using the patent and citation dataset. If patents filed by 
firms from one industry are most cited by (most likely to cite) patents from one 
technological class in the previous 10 years, we define that the industry and the class 
have a producer-user (user-producer) relationship. We can then compare the affected 
technological classes to other unaffected classes to better pin down the effect of mergers 
between innovation producers and users. Moreover, a technological class can be related 
to the target firm in one merger and unrelated in another merger at the same time, so we 
can then capture the effect of related M&A within the same technological class. We 
show that a tech-class been targeted in related mergers becomes more innovative 
compared to the same tech-class in unrelated mergers. 
If M&As between innovation users and producers do internalize positive externalities 
and incentivize innovation, firms should fund more innovation in targeted technological 
classes and less in other classes after mergers. We find that this is indeed the case: we 
observe an increase in innovation output in the targeted classes and a decline in other 
classes. Moreover, financially unconstrained firms tend to reallocate resources to 
targeted classes from other unaffected classes. 
Finally, we test the impact of innovation-related M&As on tech-class level innovation. 
If a technological class is more likely to be involved in related mergers, the innovation 
should be enhanced in that technological class. Our results support this hypothesis. 
The first identification challenge comes from the concern that the increase may be 
mechanical. It may be the case that innovation increases after mergers not because of 
the synergy or internalizing positive externality, but simply due to the fact that target 
firm files patents anyway. For example, Sevilier and Tian (2012) show that firms 
undertake M&As for the purpose of acquiring innovation. To address this concern, first, 
we use unrelated mergers as the control group in the firm-level regressions so that the 
mechanical increase cancels out with each other. Using a control group may not entirely 
eliminate the concern of mechanical increase because one can argue that target firms in 
related mergers tend to be more innovative. We address this concern in the firm-class 
level regressions. Targets and acquirers in related mergers do not necessarily file patents 
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in the same technological class. In fact, among the M&A deals with public target firms, 
the technological classes of acquirers and targets do not overlap in most of the deals. 
Moreover, even when acquirers and targets have overlapping technological classes, 
they are not necessarily defined as targeted classes but are included in the control group. 
Therefore, the increase in patents in targeted technological classes is not caused by 
mechanical reasons. 
The second concern is that the increase in innovation and M&A activity can be 
endogenous. For example, a firm with a large amount of free cash may invest more in 
innovation and M&A activities at the same time. We address this concern by including 
M&A deal fixed effects and technological class fixed effects in the regressions. To 
further establish a causal effect between M&A activity and innovation, we use the 
method developed by Savor and Lu (2009) to compare the change of innovation around 
successful mergers to that of mergers withdrawn for reasons that are exogenous to 
innovation. For example, we exclude mergers that are withdrawn due to the 
disagreement on the future development strategy between the acquirer and the target 
because this reason may be related to future innovation strategy. By ruling out the 
systematic relation between a firm’s innovation and the probability of a failed merger, 
this strategy can help identify the causal effect of a firm’s M&A on its innovation output. 
A firm that decides to invest more in innovation can choose to acquire another firm with 
relevant knowledge to achieve this goal. However, the innovation output does not 
increase when the merger is withdrawn. Our result is consistent with existing literature 
and shows that the innovation output increases more after successful user-producer 
mergers relative to failed user-producer mergers. 
Another identification challenge comes from shocks at the industry level. For instance, 
suppose an industry is growing fast, and its product market is becoming more and more 
competitive, firms will merge to exploit synergies to differentiate their products from 
their competitors. By the same token, the innovation of the industry may also reach the 
peak given the inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation 
(Aghion, et al. 2005). This industry, with more patents, is more likely to become the top 
producer or user of innovation of other industries. Therefore, industry-level shocks may 
  
78 
 
be driving both innovation-related M&As and innovation outputs. Fortunately, the 
concern of such shocks can be mitigated by using firm tech-class level data because the 
tech-class level relationship is less correlated with the acquirers’ industry condition. In 
addition, we control for any shocks to technological classes by including a full set of 
class-year fixed effects. The fixed effects are identified because a technological class 
can be involved in a related merger and an unrelated merger at the same time.  
Our paper contributes to the M&A literature and the innovation literature in at least two 
ways. We are the first to develop a measure of innovation-user and innovation-producer 
industries and a user-producer relationship between industries and technological classes, 
which can be used in future research. And we show that M&As between an innovation-
user and an innovation-producer can internalize the positive externalities associated 
with funding innovation, and the increase of innovation is driven by the targeted 
technological classes.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature 
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the sample construction, empirical methodology, 
and sample overview. Section 3.4 reports the empirical results on changes in 
innovations around M&As. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Our study is related both to studies in firm innovation and studies in M&As. Innovation 
is an important driver of firm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2002; Levine 2005), 
and the quality of patents correlates with a firm’s market value (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg 2005). Kogan et al. (2017) also find that the stock market positively reacts 
to the approval of patents that are eventually highly cited, and that such patents predict 
firm productivity. Given the importance of firm innovation, it is essential to understand 
the factors that incentivize it. Some papers empirically show that CEOs’ incentives have 
a significant impact on motivating innovation. For example, both corporate venture 
capital (Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian 2014) and stock options in CEOs’ 
compensation (Chang et al. 2015) motivate managers to undertake innovative projects.  
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Despite the importance and incentive of innovation, funding it can be difficult. Brown, 
Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) is the first paper to show that cash flow and external equity 
are essential to financing innovations in young firms. Large and publicly traded firms 
also depend on banks, and they receive cheaper bank loans if they produce higher-
quality patents (Hall and Lerner 2010). It indicates that firms and lenders consider the 
cost of innovation and the value associated with the innovation. If the benefit of 
innovation spread across industries and is not easily appropriable, this positive 
externality will cause firms to underinvest in innovation. 
Several papers study the effect of M&As on innovation. Seru (2014) shows that 
innovation decreases after diversifying M&As because inventors become less 
productive. Sevilir and Tian (2012) find a positive relationship between M&As and 
innovation and show that acquiring innovation is an important motive for undertaking 
M&As. Our paper takes a different approach. We consider the citation relationship 
between acquirers and target firms before the M&As and study the synergy from this 
relationship. Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) find that acquiring firms that have 
successfully innovated can be a more efficient path to obtaining innovation than 
innovating directly by oneself. We take care of the mechanical increase of innovation 
after M&As by using unrelated M&As as a control group and using firm-class level 
data. The paper that is most relevant to ours is Bena and Li (2014). They show that 
M&As are more likely to be conducted between firms with technological overlap, and 
the innovation output increases after such mergers. Their identification strategy is to 
compare successful mergers to withdrawn mergers. Our paper is different in the sense 
that our main results come from all available mergers that include about 2,804 deals, 
compared to the 60 withdrawn mergers in their analysis. Additionally, we use firm-
technological-class level data to better pin down the effect. We will elaborate on this 
idea in the empirical part of the paper. 
This paper is the first to study the citation links between industries and technological 
classes using a novel patent citation dataset. We show that merging two firms from the 
user industry and the producer industry internalize the positive externalities of 
innovations and enhances the innovation output afterward. We are also the first to study 
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the effect of M&As on firm tech-class level innovation, which allows us to mitigate the 
endogeneity concern. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
We use a novel dataset of patents and citations constructed by Kogan et al. (2017). The 
dataset includes the entire history of US patent documents from Google Patents. The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) allows only individuals to be the 
inventor, but an individual can assign granted patent to another person or to a 
corporation. Therefore, patents always have an inventor, and sometimes they have been 
assigned to one or more corporations. Kogan et al. then matched the corporation names 
to firms in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock return database. 
The dataset covers patents granted from 1926 to 2010 that are assigned to firms in the 
CRSP database. The USPTO also keeps track of all citations for patents granted from 
1976 to 2010. Compared to the NBER patent project, this dataset provides 1.9 million 
patents that can be matched to companies, 27 percent of which are not included in the 
NBER data.4 Another commonly used measure of innovation is R&D expenditures, 
but 65 percent of firm-year observations from Compustat have missing values. Missing 
R&D expenditures in financial statements do not necessarily mean that the firm is not 
innovative (Koh and Reeb 2015). Therefore, compared to R&D expenditures, patent-
based metrics better reflect the productivity of R&D and more realistically reflect a 
firm’s innovation performance. Using this patent and citation dataset allows us to 
measure the innovation output for every public firm in every year. 
In addition, the USPTO has developed an elaborate classification system for the 
patented inventions. This system categories technologies into about 400 3-digit patent 
 
4 The dataset is provided by Noah Stoffman on his website (https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents). 
This dataset covers more patents and corresponding firms than NBER patents data mainly 
because the patent text files provided by Google have better quality than the files provided by 
USPTO, so more patent assignees can be identified. More details of the patent data construction 
can be found in the paper and the online appendix of Kogan et al. (2017). 
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classes, and each patent belongs to a technological class. Using the classification data, 
we can further measure the innovation output of each firm in each class and analyze the 
effect of M&A on the firm tech-class level. 
To identify a sample of M&As, we begin with all completed US M&As with effective 
dates from 1984 to 2007, covered by the mergers and acquisitions database of Thomson 
Reuters’ SDC Database5. We exclude the deal if: (1) the acquirer or the target firm is 
from the financial industry (Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] codes 6000 to 
6999); (2) the transaction value of the deal is less than $10 million, to drop the small 
and economically insignificant deals; (3) the acquiring firm cannot be matched to 
Compustat/CRSP; (4) the acquiring firm did not file any patent the year before the 
merger; (5) the acquiring firm exists less than three years before or after the M&A 
because there is a few years’ lag between starting an innovative project and filing 
patents. To make sure the acquirers are innovative before mergers, we require them to 
have at least one patent the year before the mergers. We do not require the target firms 
to be matched to Compustat/CRSP because most of the target firms are private firms; 
excluding them would result in a large drop in the sample size. Large firms tend to buy 
innovation by acquiring small private firms that are engaged in R&D, so excluding the 
sample of private target firms would lead to biased estimation. Our final M&A sample 
contains 2,804 deals for the period 1984 to 2007. 
3.3.2 Related M&As and targeted tech-classes 
To examine how mergers between innovation-user and innovation-producer can 
enhance innovation output, we need to define the user-producer relationship between 
industries. In year t, industry i and j are innovation related industries if in the previous 
10 years6, the patents filed by firms in industry i is among the top-3 industries that cite 
(are cited by) patents filed by firms in industry j. Similarly, we define the relationship 
 
5 Our sample begins in 1984 because information on M&As in SDC is less reliable before 1984. 
Our sample period ends on December 31, 2007, three years before our patent data end in 2010. 
Allowing a three-year period after the last merger can mitigate the potential truncation bias in 
our innovation output measures. 
6 Using previous 3 years does not change our results. 
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between industries and technological classes. In year t, industry i and technological 
class j are related if, in the previous 10 years, the patents filed by firms in technological 
class j is among the top-3 classes that cite (are cited by) patents filed in industry i. In 
this definition, the user-producer relationship updates every year and can capture the 
changing relationship over time. In our final sample, 1,567 deals are between firms 
from related industries (related M&As), and 12% of the technological classes of 
acquirers (targeted classes) are related to the target firms’ industry. 
3.3.3 Variables 
We employ various measures of innovation to capture different aspects of a firm’s 
innovation performance. We begin with the number of patents filed each year and the 
number of citations received by those patents. We count patents at the time when they 
are filed with the USPTO because inventors have the incentives to file the patent as 
soon as it is finished, the filing date is the closest to the actual time of innovation. The 
citations are counted after the grant date when a patent is revealed and starts to be cited 
by the public. Because the distribution is positively skewed, we use the natural 
logarithm of these innovation measures. 
Some technological classes have more patents and receive more citations than other 
classes by nature. To adjust for this heterogeneity, we also create a citation-weighted 
number of patents and a patent index. The citation-weighted number of patents scales 
the patent citation by the average number of citations a patent received in the same year 
and the same technology class (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001). We also follow Bena 
and Li (2014) to calculate the patent index of each firm. The patent index is the patent 
number adjusted by the median value of each technology class. 7  However, the 
measures of patents and citations are meaningful only when used comparatively, the 
fact that a firm files 10 or 100 patents does not tell you whether the firm is highly 
innovative. That is, the evaluation of the patent intensity needs to be made with 
references to some “benchmark” intensity. Therefore, we control for deal fixed effects 
 
7 Details of how to construct these measures are reported in the Appendix C. 
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or tech-class fixed effects in the regressions. 
In the analyses, we use the measures of innovation output as the dependent variables. 
Our key test variables are the After dummy, which equals one if the observation is after 
M&As and zero otherwise, and the Related dummy, which equals one if the deal is a 
related M&A and zero otherwise. The After dummy captures the change of innovation 
around M&As, and the Related dummy captures the difference between related M&As 
and unrelated M&As. In the multivariate tests, we include control variables that may 
affect firm innovation. R&D/Assets is the R&D expense adjusted by total assets. Sales 
are the total sales as a measure of firm size. ROA is the return on assets, defined as the 
operating income before depreciation, divided by total assets. Leverage is the total debt 
divided by total assets. Capital expenditure, Capex, is the capital expenditure divided 
by total assets. Tangibility is the total gross property, plant, and equipment divided by 
total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. HHI is the 
Herfindahl index that captures the competition of a 3-digit SIC industry. 
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of firm innovations and control variables. Panel 
A shows a summary of all acquiring firms during the sample period. Panels B, C, and 
D report the M&A characteristics. From 1984 to 2007, there are 2,804 deals of M&As, 
of which 1,583 deals are innovation-related M&As. Panel E shows the summary 
statistics of firm-class level innovation. An average firm file patents in 3.8 technological 
classes in the year before mergers, the median number is 3. An average firm file patents 
in 12.3 technological classes during the entire sample period, the median number is 10. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Univariate tests 
Because firm innovation and the decision to merge are endogenously determined, it is 
difficult to compare innovation between firms involved in related M&As and unrelated 
M&As. Therefore, we use a panel structure approach to control for many factors that 
affect both innovation and M&A decisions, such as R&D, ROA, and leverage. Before 
doing so, we provide some simple summary evidence on differences in firm innovation 
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between related and unrelated M&As. 
We first conduct a before-after comparison among firms involved in related M&As and 
unrelated M&As, respectively. In Table 3.2, Panel A reports the change of firm 
innovation and characteristics around related M&As. The variables are the average 
value of three years’ observations before or after M&As. The number of patents, 
citation-weighted number of patents, and patent index all increase significantly after 
related M&As. The originality of patents also increases. In Panel B, we conduct the 
before-after test among firms involved in unrelated M&As, and the change of generality 
and patent index is insignificant. Panel C reports comparisons of the change after 
related M&As and unrelated M&As. The results show that the number of patents, the 
citation-weighted patents, the patent index, originality, and generality all increase by a 
higher amount after related M&As compared to unrelated M&As.  
3.4.2 Multivariate tests of firm-level innovation 
We use a panel structure to analyze the innovation around related M&As. Because the 
increase of innovation output can be mechanical, we use unrelated M&As as the control 
group and perform the difference-in-difference tests in a multivariate setting. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression using a sample of all related and 
unrelated M&As:  
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡              (3.1) 
where Innovationi,t is one of the innovation measures of firm i in year t; Afteri,t is a 
dummy that equals one if it is after the M&As and zero otherwise; Relatedi,t equals one 
for mergers between innovation users and innovation producers (related M&As) and 
equals zero otherwise. We keep 6 years of data before and after each M&A because it 
usually takes a few years for the acquired knowledge to turn into patents. We include 
M&A deal fixed effects to difference away any time-invariant differences among deals8, 
and we use year fixed effects to control for common trends in all M&A deals. Therefore, 
 
8 The coefficient on Relatedi,t is absorbed by deal fixed effects. 
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this model estimates the change over time in innovation output for the same cross-
section units. The variable of interest is the interaction term of After dummy and Related 
dummy that captures the change of innovation after the acquiring firm merges with a 
target firm that is in the upstream or downstream industries of patent citations. The 
hypothesis that related M&As can internalize the positive externalities predicts that the 
coefficient β2 is positive, meaning that the combined firm is more productive after 
related mergers relative to unrelated mergers. 
We include control variables commonly used in the previous literature. Bena and Li 
(2014) find that firms that are larger, have higher ROA, and have higher market-to-
book ratios are more likely to be the acquirers. We, therefore, include the variable 
Tobin’s Q to control for investment opportunities; Sales to control for size; and ROA to 
control for profitability. Other factors include leverage, capital expenditures, tangibility, 
and R&D expenses. The results are reported in Table 3.3. In all regressions throughout 
the paper, we control for M&A deal fixed effects and year fixed effects, and the p-values 
reported are based on deal-level clustered standard errors. 
In the first column of Table 3.3, the dependent variable is the total number of patents 
filed by a firm, and the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent level. The result indicates that the increase of innovation after related 
M&As is greater than that after unrelated M&As. In columns 3 to 6, we use different 
measures of firm innovation, and the coefficients are all significantly positive. In 
column 2, the coefficients on the interaction term are insignificant but still show a 
positive sign. In summary, the difference-in-difference tests in Table 3.3 show that 
related M&As enhance the quantity and quality of innovation output more than 
unrelated M&As do. The results indicate that after the merger of two firms from related 
industries, the combined firm is more likely to benefit from the innovation, and thus 
innovation output is enhanced to a new, optimal level.  
The coefficient on After (β1) captures the effect of unrelated M&As on innovation 
output, and they are all significantly negative as shown in Table 3.3. This finding is 
consistent with Seru (2014), which shows that innovation ability decreases after 
conglomerating mergers. Because the combined firm may be reluctant to fund 
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innovative ideas, inventors may leave the firm around diversifying mergers while 
stayers become less productive (Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005). Other 
literature, including Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Cassiman et al. (2005), points out 
that M&A activities increase financial leverage and the opportunity cost of funding 
R&D, which leads to the elimination of R&D projects, especially for debt-financed 
M&As. Our results show that the decrease in innovation output is mitigated when the 
mergers are between an innovation user and an innovation producer.  
3.4.3 Firm tech-class level test 
The synergy between innovation user and innovation producer makes it easier for firms 
to appropriate the value of innovation, obtain relevant knowledge, internalize costs, 
more likely to fund innovation, and thus enhance innovation output after mergers. 
However, this synergy and enhancement should mainly occur in the targeted 
technological classes rather than every area of research within the firm. To examine the 
effect of M&As on the targeted technological class and other classes within the same 
firm, we estimate the following firm tech-class level difference-in-difference 
specification:  
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  +𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (3.2) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes technological classes, t indexes years. Afteri,t is a 
dummy that equals one if it is after the M&As; Targeted Classi,j,t equals one if the 
technological class j of the acquirer i is in a user-producer relationship with the target’s 
industry. The coefficient of interest is β3, which measures the effect of M&As on 
targeted classes relative to other classes. We include firm fixed effects and class by year 
fixed effects in the regressions. The class by year fixed effects control for any 
technological class level shocks. 
The dependent variables are various measures of firm tech-class level innovation output, 
include the number of patents filed by firm i in year t that belong to technological class 
j; the number of citations received by these patents in the subsequent 3 years after 
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granted; the citation-adjusted number of patents; and the patent index. The control 
variables are the same as those in equation (3.1). To mitigate the effect of outliers, we 
winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To account for serial and cross-
sectional dependence across classes within the same firm, we cluster standard errors at 
the deal level.  
Table 3.4, Panel A shows the effect of M&As on innovation output of the targeted 
technological classes and other classes within the same firm. As shown in column 1, 
after mergers, the number of patents in the targeted class increases by 4.7% relative to 
the other tech-classes in the same firm. The coefficients on the interaction term are 
positive in columns 3 and 4, and they are both significant, meaning that both the 
citation-adjusted patents and the patent index increase significantly in the targeted class 
compared to the other tech-classes.  
The interaction term in the above difference-in-difference model shows the difference 
between targeted classes and other classes, but does not tell the exact changes in each 
of the two categories. In four out of the six columns in Table 3.4, the coefficients on 
After (β1) are significantly negative, meaning that the innovation output decreases in 
other technological classes. The sum of coefficients on After (β1) and the interaction 
term (β3) captures the effect of M&As on targeted technological classes, and they are 
all positive, meaning that the innovation output increases in targeted technological 
classes. These results support the hypothesis that firms reallocate resources from the 
other classes to the targeted class. 
3.4.4 Reallocation of innovation within firms 
Reallocation of resources within firms rests on the premise that firms are financially 
constrained so that it is necessary to winner-pick the best performing sectors (Stein 
1997). Giroud and Mueller (2015) find that financially constrained firms reallocate 
capital and labor to plants experiencing positive shocks, but unconstrained firms use 
external funding and do not reallocate within the firm. Similarly, we expect to see the 
reallocation of innovation funding in financially constrained firms. To test this 
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hypothesis, we examine the effect separately for financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms by estimating equation (3.2) in two subsamples. We use the KZ 
index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) to measure financial constraints. A firm is 
financially unconstrained (constrained) if the firm’s KZ index is below (above) the 
median of all sample firms in the year before M&As9. Table 3.5, Panel A reports the 
results of constrained firms. Panel B reports the results using unconstrained firms.   
In all six columns of Panel A, the coefficients on the After dummy are significantly 
negative, meaning that the quality and quantity of innovation output decrease in 
unaffected tech-classes. The sum of coefficients on After and the interaction term 
estimate the effect of M&As on targeted tech-classes, and the values are close to zero 
in column 1, 3, and 4, meaning that the quantity of innovation output does not change 
in targeted classes after M&As in financially constrained firms. However, in columns 
5 and 6, the originality and generality increase significantly in targeted classes. The 
results indicate that although financially constrained firms have trouble in funding 
innovation after related M&As, the mergers between innovation users and innovation 
producers can enhance the quality of innovation output. In Panel B, the coefficients on 
After and the interaction term show that M&As enhance the innovation output in 
targeted classes in financially unconstrained firms, and the innovation output remains 
the same in the other unaffected classes. The difference of results in Panel A and B 
indicates that financially constrained firms reallocate resources from other classes to 
fund targeted classes, while unconstrained firms can fund more innovation in targeted 
classes and maintain the innovation level in other classes.  
Another premise of reallocation is that firms conduct innovative research in multiple 
technological classes. A firm operating in many classes may be easier to move the 
resource to one important class. Therefore, we estimate the effect of mergers on 
innovation with respect to the number of technological classes. A dummy Few Classes 
equals one if, in the year before mergers, the number of technological classes of a firm 
 
9 The financial constrained dummy is generated conditioning on firms that conducted M&As. 
An acquirer can be defined as financially constrained compared to other acquirers but 
financially more flexible than an average firm of the whole population. 
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is below the median value of all firms and equals zero otherwise. Table 3.6 reports the 
results. The positive coefficient on the triple interaction term means that the innovation 
output of targeted classes increases more in firms with fewer technological classes. This 
result contradicts our reallocation hypothesis. Instead, it indicates that firms that 
concentrate innovation in fewer classes can conduct research in the targeted class where 
the patent value is more appropriable.   
3.4.5 The aggregate effect of M&As 
As shown in the previous tables, M&As between innovation-user and innovation-
producer can enhance the innovation output of the targeted technological class as well 
as the combined firm. In this part, we consider the aggregate effect at the technological 
class level. To be more specific, a technological class involved in related M&As will 
experience an increase in innovation output. We then construct a class-year panel 
dataset. The dummy Targeted Class equals 1 if that class is involved in at least one 
innovation-related mergers and 0 otherwise. We control for class fixed effects in the 
regressions. The results are reported in Table 3.7. The positive coefficient means that 
after mergers, the innovation output quantity increases in technological classes that are 
involved in innovation-related mergers.  
3.4.6 Withdrawn M&As 
We also employ the identification strategy developed by Savor and Lu (2009). They 
compare the change of innovation around successful mergers to that of mergers 
withdrawn for reasons that are exogenous to innovation. We followed Bena and Li 
(2014) to construct the control group using withdrawn M&As. We begin with 191 
unsuccessful friendly merger bids that are announced from 1984 to 2007. We then keep 
deals where the news articles from Factiva did not mention R&D activity as a reason 
for the failure. Table 3.8, Panel A presents the filters. The final control group includes 
67 unsuccessful merger bids.  
Next, we construct the treatment sample of completed deals that: (i) involve acquirers 
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and target firms of which data are available in Compustat/CRSP; (ii) occur in related 
(unrelated) acquirer-target industry pairs that match related (unrelated) industry pairs 
of the failed mergers; and (iii) are announced within the three-year window centered at 
the announcement year of the failed mergers (514 deals). For the failed mergers that are 
matched to multiple deals, we select the completed deal with the closest relative size 
ratio, measured by the target firm’s total assets divided by the acquirer’s total assets. 
To estimate the different effects from successful mergers and failed mergers, we create 
a dummy Treated that equals one for successful M&As; Related equals one for M&As 
of two firms from two related industries. Table 3.8, Panel B shows that after a successful 
M&As, the patents increase when the two firms are from related industries. Panel C 
reports the falsification test results in which we falsely assume that the onset of 
treatment occurs four years before it actually does. Results in Panel C show that the 
coefficients on the triple interaction term are insignificant as expected. 
3.4.7 Robustness tests 
This study focuses on the relationship between innovation user and innovation producer 
instead of shared knowledge or technology proximity. Although our measure of 
innovation-related M&As is different from M&As between firms doing similar 
innovative research, these two measures may be overlapped. An industry can be its own 
innovation user or producer, so our results captures the synergy between firms in the 
same industry instead of the innovation-related industries. To mitigate this concern, we 
exclude M&As between firms from the same industry and estimate equation (3.1) again. 
The results in Table 3.9 shows that our results still hold. 
Next, we conduct the analysis using a higher-level classification of patents instead of 
technological classes. Because there are over 400 tech-classes, two different tech-
classes can be very similar, and firms can switch between similar tech-classes 
effortlessly. Therefore, the narrow definition of the technological class may bias our 
estimations. To alleviate this concern, we re-estimate the effect of related M&As on 
innovations at the firm sub-category level. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) aggregate 
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the 400 tech-classes into 36 two-digit technological sub-categories. We can then 
measure the innovation output of each firm in each sub-category. The results in Table 
3.10 show a similar positive effect of M&A on targeted sub-categories.  
Finally, we use different measures of related industries as robustness tests. In the main 
tests, we measure the citation relationship between industries using the previous 10 
years of data and define the top 3 pairs as related. In Table 3.11, we use the previous 10 
years or 3 years of data and define the top 1 pair, 3 pairs, and 5 pairs as related industries. 
For simplicity, we only report the results using the Patent Index as dependent variables. 
Using other measures of innovation output give qualitatively similar results to the main 
tables. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Fundamental innovations usually involve huge upfront costs, but the benefits are spread 
across various sectors and are difficult for the inventors to appropriate. That means 
innovations possess positive externalities and are underinvested in by individual firms. 
We empirically show that after M&As between firms from user industries and producer 
industries of innovations, the combined firm can internalize the positive externalities 
and enhance innovation output. We use failed M&As as an identification strategy, and 
the results are robust. 
Using a firm tech-class level dataset, we find that the increase in firm-level patents is 
driven by the patents in the technological class that is in a user-producer relationship 
with the target firm. While financially unconstrained acquirers fund more innovation in 
the targeted tech-classes, constrained firms move resources from other unaffected tech-
classes to the targeted classes. The firm-class panel data also help to mitigate the 
concerns of mechanical increase and endogeneity.
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3.6 Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of key variables from 1984 to 2007, including 
1,318 acquiring firms and 2,804 M&A deals. If an acquiring firm conducts multiple 
M&As within three years, we exclude all those deals. Based on our definition of 
industry-level innovation relationship, 1,567 M&As are between an innovation-user 
firm and an innovation-producer firm. The innovation measures are defined in Table 
B.1. Panel B, C, and D report the M&A summary statistics. The sample includes 
acquiring firms that filed at least one patent one year before the mergers. Panel E reports 
the firm technological-class level summary statistics. 
 
Panel A: Firm summary 
  Mean Median St. dev. 
Innovation Measures    
#Patents 30.400 3.688 107.171 
#Citations 54.932 4.000 221.505 
#Citations per patent 1.283 0.800 1.763 
#Patent - Citationweighted 61.403 6.157 220.182 
NumPat 1.664 1.251 1.428 
NumCited 1.495 1.011 1.498 
CiteWeightPat 1.975 1.576 1.628 
Patent Index 17.746 2.328 59.269 
Originality 0.479 0.500 0.287 
Generality 0.459 0.481 0.287 
    
Control Variables    
Assets Total 4775.677 671.175 17351.520 
ROA 0.084 0.123 0.169 
Leverage 0.210 0.195 0.156 
R&D/Assets 0.092 0.059 0.106 
Capex/Assets 0.057 0.050 0.034 
TobinQ 2.376 1.834 1.604 
Tangibility 0.253 0.205 0.178 
HHI 0.045 0.028 0.058 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Distribution by year of execution 
Period 
1984–
1987 
1988–
1991 
1992–
1995 
1996–
1999 
2000–
2003 
2004–
2007 Total 
#M&As 296 307 371 690 725 415 2,804 
#related M&As 110 135 192 413 455 262 1,567 
 
Panel C: Distribution of top five industries (4-digit SIC) for acquirers 
Industry (SIC) 
Prepackaged 
Software 
(7372) 
Semiconductors 
and Related 
Devices 
 (3674) 
Pharmaceutical 
Preparations 
(2834) 
Biological 
Products  
(2836) 
Surgical and 
Medical 
Instruments  
(3841) 
#M&As 215 182 153 80 75 
#related M&As 184 155 139 69 56 
 
Panel D: Distribution of top five industries (4-digit SIC) for targets 
Industry (SIC) 
Prepackaged 
Software 
(7372) 
Semiconductors 
and Related 
Devices  
(3674) 
Pharmaceutical 
Preparations 
(2834) 
Surgical and 
Medical 
Instruments  
(3841) 
Computer 
Peripheral 
Equipment  
(3577) 
#M&As 228 138 110 83 56 
#related M&As 179 128 106 68 52 
 
Panel E: Firm tech-class summary 
  All Classes  Related Classes  Other Classes  
  Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
#Patents 6.643 20.445 10.279 29.128 5.530 16.768 
#Citations 15.525 72.853 25.094 107.390 12.597 58.035 
#Patent - Citationweighted 13.855 46.153 21.437 65.986 11.535 37.780 
NumPat 0.449 0.820 0.812 1.090 0.383 0.742 
NumCited 0.404 0.994 0.766 1.359 0.338 0.897 
CiteWeightPat 0.577 1.039 1.026 1.348 0.496 0.951 
Patent Index 1.262 5.847 2.685 9.063 1.004 5.008 
Originality 0.143 0.272 0.251 0.321 0.123 0.258 
Generality 0.137 0.267 0.237 0.317 0.119 0.253 
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Table 3.2: Univariate tests of innovation before and after M&As 
This table provides univariate test results of the innovation and firm characteristics 
before and after M&As. Panel A includes all related M&As, and Panel B includes all 
unrelated M&As. An M&A is defined as “related” if the target and the acquirer are from 
two related industries; two industries are defined as “related” if patents filed by firms 
in one industry is among the top three industries citing or been cited by patents filed by 
firms in another industry in the previous 10 years. Panel C reports the results from a 
difference-in-difference univariate test by comparing the change of variables around 
related M&As to unrelated M&As. The variables are the mean value of three years 
before or after M&As. 
 
Panel A: Related M&As  
 After Before Diff p-value N 
#Patents 62.499 52.403 10.097 0.002  1,567  
#Citations 116.555 155.361 -38.807 0.003  1,567  
#Patent - Citationweighted 130.816 116.135 14.681 0.041  1,567  
NumPat 2.285 2.287 -0.001 0.955  1,567  
NumCited 1.822 2.522 -0.701 0.000  1,567  
CiteWeightPat 2.628 2.768 -0.141 0.000  1,567  
Patent Index 35.170 32.202 2.968 0.099  1,567  
Originality 0.578 0.568 0.010 0.075  1,567  
Generality 0.544 0.553 -0.009 0.103  1,578  
R&D/Assets 0.099 0.106 -0.008 0.000  1,408  
Assets Total 7972.694 4376.186 3596.508 0.000  1,567  
ROA 0.097 0.114 -0.017 0.000  1,567  
Leverage 0.209 0.169 0.040 0.000  1,567  
Capex/Assets 0.046 0.064 -0.017 0.000  1,567  
TobinQ 2.236 3.110 -0.874 0.000  1,567  
Tangibility 0.211 0.240 -0.030 0.000  1,567  
HHI 0.036 0.030 0.005 0.000  1,567  
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Panel B: Unrelated M&As  
 After Before Diff p-value N 
#Patents 47.479 42.159 5.321 0.073  1,237  
#Citations 76.525 90.845 -14.320 0.106  1,237  
#Patent - Citationweighted 95.285 82.948 12.337 0.040  1,237  
NumPat 2.042 2.131 -0.089 0.000  1,237  
NumCited 1.652 2.090 -0.438 0.000  1,237  
CiteWeightPat 2.328 2.487 -0.160 0.000  1,237  
Patent Index 28.131 28.044 0.087 0.958  1,237  
Originality 0.591 0.596 -0.004 0.514  1,237  
Generality 0.561 0.586 -0.025 0.000  1,237  
R&D/Assets 0.046 0.051 -0.005 0.000  951  
Assets Total 11480.556 6995.843 4484.713 0.000  1,237  
ROA 0.123 0.138 -0.015 0.000  1,237  
Leverage 0.263 0.228 0.035 0.000  1,237  
Capex/Assets 0.051 0.065 -0.014 0.000  1,237  
TobinQ 1.740 1.985 -0.245 0.000  1,237  
Tangibility 0.278 0.310 -0.032 0.000  1,237  
HHI 0.062 0.058 0.004 0.000  1,237  
 
Panel C: Difference-in-difference tests 
  Related Unrelated   
  Diff Diff DiD p-value 
#Patents 10.097 5.321 4.776 0.143 
#Citations -38.807 -14.320 -24.487 0.071 
#Patent - Citationweighted 14.681 12.337 2.344 0.404 
NumPat -0.001 -0.089 0.088 0.008 
NumCited -0.701 -0.438 -0.263 0.000 
CiteWeightPat -0.141 -0.160 0.019 0.329 
Patent Index 2.968 0.087 2.881 0.123 
Originality 0.010 -0.004 0.014 0.048 
Generality -0.009 -0.025 0.016 0.032 
R&D/Assets -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.146 
Assets Total 3596.508 4484.713 -888.205 0.035 
ROA -0.017 -0.015 -0.002 0.339 
Leverage 0.040 0.035 0.005 0.175 
Capex/Assets -0.017 -0.014 -0.003 0.000 
TobinQ -0.874 -0.245 -0.629 0.000 
Tangibility -0.030 -0.032 0.002 0.167 
HHI 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.247 
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Table 3.3: Firm-level innovation around related M&As 
This table tests the effects of related M&As on firm innovation, using unrelated M&As as a control group. The sample contains observations for 
six years before and six years after M&A. The dependent variables are the six measures of firm innovations. The key independent variable, After, 
equals one if the observation is after the M&As and zero otherwise. Related equals one if it is the merger is between firms from an innovation-
user industry and an innovation-producer industry and equals zero otherwise. We include M&A deal fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 
standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat 
Ln(Patent 
Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.196*** -0.105*** -0.198*** -0.212*** -0.0274*** -0.0285*** 
 (-7.641) (-2.934) (-6.588) (-8.522) (-3.892) (-4.195) 
After * Related 0.185*** 0.0583 0.138*** 0.206*** 0.0189** 0.0252*** 
 (5.121) (1.160) (3.306) (5.870) (2.131) (2.942) 
R&D/Assets 0.309** 0.517*** 0.390** 0.387*** 0.0435 0.0104 
 (2.392) (2.911) (2.510) (3.030) (1.198) (0.323) 
Sales -0.162*** -0.135** -0.186*** -0.153*** -0.0412*** -0.0336*** 
 (-3.891) (-2.320) (-3.798) (-4.013) (-3.765) (-3.173) 
ROA 0.136* 0.188* 0.170* 0.172** 0.0267 0.0214 
 (1.669) (1.662) (1.793) (2.185) (1.312) (1.102) 
Leverage -0.205*** -0.178* -0.298*** -0.200*** 0.00852 -0.0278* 
 (-2.945) (-1.828) (-3.562) (-2.986) (0.489) (-1.708) 
Capex/Assets -0.215** -0.573*** -0.339*** -0.223** 0.0620* 0.0578* 
 (-1.967) (-3.669) (-2.580) (-2.168) (1.943) (1.857) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
       
TobinQ -0.00843*** 0.0232*** 0.00552 -0.00505 -0.00367*** -0.00342*** 
 (-2.658) (5.352) (1.488) (-1.559) (-4.111) (-4.026) 
Tangibility 0.914*** 1.496*** 1.155*** 0.776*** 0.0549 0.00558 
 (4.608) (5.184) (4.854) (4.057) (0.916) (0.0950) 
HHI 0.241** -0.419** 0.186 0.257*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 
 (2.334) (-2.540) (1.367) (2.582) (3.471) (3.125) 
       
Observations 26,965 26,965 26,965 26,965 26,965 26,965 
R-squared 0.872 0.823 0.855 0.860 0.648 0.683 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.4: Firm-class level innovation around M&As 
This table tests the effects of M&As on firm-class level innovation output. The key independent variable, After, equals one if the observation is 
after the M&As and zero otherwise. Targeted Class is a dummy variable that equals one if it is the technological class of the acquirer and the 
industry of the target has the innovation user-producer relationship and equals zero otherwise. We include M&A deal fixed effects and class by 
year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.0163*** 0.00601 -0.0156** -0.0131*** -0.00398** -0.00184 
 (-3.055) (0.848) (-2.338) (-2.925) (-2.218) (-1.067) 
Targeted Class 0.265*** 0.296*** 0.337*** 0.213*** 0.0679*** 0.0685*** 
 (14.28) (12.56) (14.92) (13.70) (14.39) (14.05) 
After * Targeted Class 0.0473*** -0.0519** 0.0371* 0.0351** 0.0212*** 0.0190*** 
 (2.650) (-2.110) (1.752) (2.372) (4.597) (4.137) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 319,884 319,884 319,884 319,884 319,884 319,884 
R-squared 0.533 0.502 0.509 0.509 0.403 0.416 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Class*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.5: Firm heterogeneity – Financial constraints 
This table reports the effect of M&As among financially constrained and non-constrained firms. Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are 
firm whose measure of financial constraints lies above (below) the median across all firms one year before the mergers. Panel A include financially 
constrained firms. Panel B includes financially unconstrained firms. We include M&A deal fixed effects and class by year fixed effects. The 
standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsample of financially constrained firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.0243*** -0.0161* -0.0299*** -0.0200*** -0.00516* -0.00485* 
 (-3.214) (-1.735) (-3.193) (-3.097) (-1.877) (-1.852) 
Targeted Class 0.275*** 0.286*** 0.335*** 0.223*** 0.0722*** 0.0742*** 
 (10.24) (8.517) (10.32) (9.822) (10.09) (9.753) 
After * Targeted Class 0.0300 -0.0793** 0.0315 0.0188 0.0189*** 0.0224*** 
 (1.101) (-2.144) (0.987) (0.820) (2.592) (3.095) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 145,667 145,667 145,667 145,667 145,667 145,667 
R-squared 0.547 0.516 0.522 0.516 0.409 0.421 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Class*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Panel B: Subsample of financially unconstrained firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.00173 0.0233** 0.00374 -0.000959 -0.00233 0.00145 
 (-0.227) (2.178) (0.388) (-0.153) (-0.933) (0.603) 
Targeted Class 0.253*** 0.303*** 0.335*** 0.203*** 0.0654*** 0.0652*** 
 (10.09) (9.390) (10.90) (9.674) (10.40) (10.28) 
After * Targeted Class 0.0510** -0.0433 0.0290 0.0405** 0.0176*** 0.0111* 
 (2.127) (-1.301) (1.009) (2.063) (2.838) (1.812) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 166,805 166,805 166,805 166,805 166,805 166,805 
R-squared 0.565 0.532 0.544 0.550 0.443 0.458 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Class*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.6: Firm heterogeneity – Number of technological classes 
This table reports the effect of M&As among firms that conduct innovation in a few technological classes and many technological classes. Few 
Classes is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s number of technological classes is below the median across all firms one year before 
the mergers. We include M&A deal fixed effects and tech-class by year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.0295*** -0.0450*** -0.0411*** -0.0250*** -0.00698*** -0.00839*** 
 (-4.558) (-5.234) (-5.147) (-4.635) (-3.145) (-3.946) 
Targeted Class 0.383*** 0.459*** 0.474*** 0.306*** 0.0879*** 0.0898*** 
 (16.42) (15.21) (16.72) (15.54) (15.25) (15.19) 
After * Targeted Class 0.0261 -0.141*** 0.00747 0.0188 0.0123** 0.0140** 
 (1.138) (-4.303) (0.276) (0.976) (2.240) (2.553) 
After * Few Classes 0.0438*** 0.166*** 0.0841*** 0.0402*** 0.00940*** 0.0216*** 
 (4.332) (10.94) (6.529) (4.869) (2.699) (6.321) 
Targeted Class * Few Classes -0.399*** -0.545*** -0.459*** -0.310*** -0.0672*** -0.0715*** 
 (-14.75) (-15.23) (-13.71) (-13.86) (-8.858) (-9.116) 
After * Targeted Class * Few Classes 0.0731*** 0.290*** 0.100*** 0.0553** 0.0275*** 0.0139 
 (2.583) (7.365) (2.957) (2.398) (3.032) (1.600) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 316,849 316,849 316,849 316,849 316,849 316,849 
R-squared 0.536 0.506 0.512 0.512 0.403 0.417 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Class*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.7: Tech-class level regression 
This table tests the effect of related M&As on technological level innovation output. 
The sample includes class-year observations. Targeted Class equals one if that class is 
involved in at least one innovation user-producer mergers and zero otherwise. The 
standard errors are clustered at the tech-class level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Originality Generality 
            
Targeted Class 0.204*** 0.0955*** 0.217*** -0.00660** 0.00295 
 (4.726) (2.594) (4.829) (-2.126) (1.190) 
      
Observations 9,797 9,797 9,797 9,797 9,797 
R-squared 0.886 0.847 0.877 0.717 0.727 
Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.8: Failed Mergers 
Panel A reports the steps to construct the control M&A deals. We exclude deals that are 
withdrawn due to reasons endogenous to innovation. In Panel B, Treated is a dummy 
equals one if it is a successful M&A and equals zero for a failed M&A. Related equals 
one if it is the merger is between firms from an innovation-user industry and an 
innovation-producer industry and equals zero otherwise. In Panel C, we falsely assume 
that the onset of treatment occurs six years before it actually happens. The standard 
errors are clustered at the M&A deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Control sample construction 
191 All unsuccessful merger bids (excluding financial firms) 
  
-12  Difference in corporate philosophy over growth strategy (not involving R&D) 
-58  Other competing bids emerged and the acquisition with the competitor went through 
-30  Valuation issues/Problem (not involving R&D) revealed over the course of negotiations 
-4 Market/analysts expected the deal to fail 
-20  Not enough information/negotiations not completed/exogenous events (e.g., 1987 crash) 
  
67 Final control group 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
Panel B: Post-acquisition innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After 1.286*** 0.281* 1.489*** 0.432** 0.0743 0.0608 
 (2.773) (1.992) (2.890) (2.053) (1.162) (0.982) 
Treated 0.829 0.139 0.837 0.289 0.112 0.0926 
 (0.973) (0.626) (0.900) (0.777) (1.133) (0.995) 
After * Treated -1.305*** -0.264* -1.499*** -0.381*** -0.168*** -0.139** 
 (-4.038) (-1.989) (-4.229) (-3.410) (-2.712) (-2.661) 
After * Related -1.050** -0.132 -1.199** -0.510** 0.0374 0.0719 
 (-2.523) (-0.713) (-2.513) (-2.483) (0.473) (0.969) 
Treated * Related -0.253 0.130 -0.0556 -0.171 -0.0471 0.0479 
 (-0.239) (0.341) (-0.0462) (-0.385) (-0.317) (0.327) 
After * Treated * Related 1.583** 0.112 1.728** 0.853*** 0.0210 -0.0481 
 (2.603) (0.351) (2.464) (3.086) (0.210) (-0.514) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472 
R-squared 0.839 0.704 0.837 0.861 0.789 0.812 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
Panel C: Falsification test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After 0.502 -0.0919 0.589 0.0295 0.112 -0.147 
 (0.425) (-0.103) (0.358) (0.130) (0.488) (-0.468) 
Treated 0.175 -0.186 0.237 -0.463 0.0269 -0.220 
 (0.115) (-0.204) (0.125) (-0.739) (0.107) (-0.696) 
After * Treated -0.296 0.540 -0.186 0.245 0.0263 0.258 
 (-0.230) (0.598) (-0.107) (0.575) (0.104) (0.796) 
After * Related -0.599 0.282 -0.522 -0.146 -0.125 0.146 
 (-0.478) (0.297) (-0.303) (-0.509) (-0.521) (0.457) 
Treated * Related -0.725 0.977 -0.323 -0.248 -0.0873 0.251 
 (-0.460) (0.891) (-0.156) (-0.351) (-0.324) (0.776) 
After * Treated * Related 1.251 -0.710 1.085 0.385 -0.0583 -0.259 
 (0.871) (-0.710) (0.573) (0.687) (-0.222) (-0.779) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 
R-squared 0.927 0.840 0.921 0.932 0.918 0.899 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.9: Robustness check – Exclude M&As from the same industry 
This table tests the effects of related M&As on firm innovation after excluding M&As where acquirers and targets are from the same industry. The 
sample contains observations for six years before and six years after M&As. The dependent variables are the six measures of firm innovations. 
The key independent variable, After, equals one if the observation is after the M&As and zero otherwise. Related equals one if it is the merger is 
between firms from an innovation-user industry and an innovation-producer industry and equals zero otherwise. We include M&A deal fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.103*** -0.0530 -0.118*** -0.131*** -0.0146** -0.0210*** 
 (-4.174) (-1.552) (-4.109) (-5.380) (-2.063) (-3.110) 
After * Related 0.157*** 0.0113 0.114* 0.193*** 0.00378 0.0215* 
 (3.109) (0.154) (1.951) (3.802) (0.334) (1.953) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,579 15,579 15,579 15,579 15,579 15,579 
R-squared 0.880 0.834 0.865 0.864 0.646 0.686 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.10: Robustness check – Using Sub-category classification of patents 
This table tests the effects of M&As on firm-subcategory level innovation output. The key independent variable, After, equals one if the observation 
is after the M&As and zero otherwise. Targeted SubCat is a dummy variable that equals one if it is the technological sub-category of the acquirer 
and the industry of the target has the innovation user-producer relationship and equals zero otherwise. We include M&A deal fixed effects and 
Sub-category by year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the deal and subcategory level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NumPat NumCited CiteWeightPat Ln(Patent Index) Originality Generality 
              
After -0.181*** -0.128*** -0.230*** -0.154*** -0.0495*** -0.0427*** 
 (-10.30) (-6.901) (-11.42) (-9.823) (-10.57) (-9.552) 
Targeted SubCat 0.662*** 0.713*** 0.780*** 0.573*** 0.128*** 0.131*** 
 (10.10) (9.960) (10.71) (10.26) (9.666) (10.13) 
After * Targeted SubCat 0.0952** -0.000229 0.0983** 0.0835** 0.0149 0.0157* 
 (2.324) (-0.00552) (2.099) (2.216) (1.612) (1.732) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 148,179 148,179 148,179 148,179 148,179 148,179 
R-squared 0.393 0.430 0.385 0.377 0.312 0.331 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcat-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.11: Robustness check – Different measure of related industries 
This table re-estimate the effects of M&As on firm-level innovation output using 
different measures of related industries. We use the data in the previous 10 years or 3 
years to calculate the citation relationship between industries. We then define the top 1, 
top 3, or top 5 pairs as the related industries. Related is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the acquirers and targets are from two related industries and equals zero otherwise. 
The key independent variable, After, equals one if the observation is after the M&As 
and zero otherwise. We include M&A deal fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 
standard errors are clustered at the deal level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Patent Index) 10yr top5 10yr top1 3yr top5 3yr top3 3yr top1 
            
After -0.192*** -0.111*** -0.213*** -0.200*** -0.0884*** 
 (-6.966) (-5.594) (-7.751) (-8.016) (-5.090) 
After * Related 0.168*** 0.0828** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.0379 
 (4.592) (2.231) (5.462) (5.644) (0.900) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,471 25,471 25,471 25,471 25,471 
R-squared 0.862 0.861 0.862 0.862 0.861 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Chapter 1 
Table A.1: Variable definitions 
Innovation output 
#Patents 
 
Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of 
patents filed (and eventually granted) in year t. 
 
#Citations Natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of 
citations received on the firm’s patents filed in year t. 
 
Patent Index I follow Bena and Li (2014) to construct this measure in 
three steps. First, for each technology class k and patent 
application year t, I compute the median value of the 
number of awarded patents in technology class k with 
application year t across all firms that were awarded at 
least one patent in technology class k with application 
year t. Second, I scale the number of awarded patents to 
the acquirer/target firm in technology class k with 
application year t by the corresponding technology class-
specific and application year-specific median value from 
the first step. Third, for each firm, I sum the scaled 
number of awarded patents from the second step across 
all technology classes and application years. 
 
Generality One minus the Herfindahl index of the citations received 
by the patents filed in year t based on technology classes. 
 
Originality One minus the Herfindahl index of the citations made by 
the patents filed in year t based on technology classes. 
 
Board of directors 
Female Director Ratio 
 
The fraction of directors that are female. 
Female Independent 
Director Ratio 
The fraction of directors that are female independent 
directors. ISS defines independent directors are as 
directors that have no material connection to the 
company other than a board seat. The connection should 
not potentially influence one's objectivity in the 
boardroom. 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
  
Female Non-Independent 
Director Ratio 
The fraction of directors that are female inside or 
affiliated directors. Inside directors are directors that are 
employees, highly paid, or beneficial owners of the 
company. The majority of affiliated directors are former 
CEO, non-CEO executives, family members, and 
directors that are linked to the firm through other 
relationships. 
 
Local Female Director 
Ratio 
 
The average female director ratio of firms within a 60 
miles radius. 
 
Connected Male Director 
Ratio 
The fraction of male directors on the board who sit on 
other boards of nonlocal firms on which there are female 
directors. Nonlocal firms are firms that are more than 60 
miles away. 
 
R&D/Tech experts Independent directors with corporate experience at firms 
with positive R&D or in the high-tech industry 
(Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2004; Knyazeva, 
Knyazeva, and Masulis, 2013). 
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Table A.2: Primary and nonprimary firms of female and male directors 
The table presents the difference between directors’ primary employers and other firms they work for as independent directors. The sample includes 
directors that sit on more than one board, and that ISS clearly identifies one of the firms as the primary employer. The sample includes 6,761 
director-primary-nonprimary-year observations. Panel A reports the firm and headquarter county characteristics of the primary and nonprimary 
firms of directors of a different gender. Panel B reports the distance between the primary firm and nonprimary firms. Panel C presents the 
percentage of nonprimary firms that are in the same industry as the primary firm. Industries are classified by different levels of SIC codes. Related 
industries are the industries that are major suppliers or customers industries. Panel D shows the percentage of primary and nonprimary firms of 
female (male) directors that are connected by another male director. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm and county characteristics by primary employer and gender 
  Female Directors Male Directors 
  Primary Nonprimary Diff Primary Nonprimary Diff 
Total Assets 9010.982 22791.758 13780.776*** 10581.293 13440.547 2859.254*** 
Sales 6374.033 12163.415 5789.382*** 6998.194 7801.847 803.653*** 
Market Cap 8187.201 16523.400 8336.199*** 9001.343 9846.216 844.872*** 
M/B 2.113 2.692 0.579** 1.941 1.974 0.033 
ROA 0.149 0.164 0.015*** 0.146 0.151 0.005*** 
R&D 324.814 475.887 151.073*** 240.368 257.755 17.387** 
Firm Age 28.946 35.543 6.598** 31.703 35.603 3.9*** 
Leverage 0.228 0.207 -0.021 0.233 0.233 0.000 
R&D/Assets 0.067 0.048 -0.02*** 0.043 0.043 0.000 
Tangibility 0.236 0.231 -0.005 0.282 0.285 0.003 
Dividend Yield 0.011 0.020 0.009*** 0.016 0.018 0.002*** 
Cash/Assets 0.159 0.146 -0.012 0.119 0.116 -0.003 
Population 13.967 13.879 -0.088 13.725 13.772 0.048*** 
Personal Income Per Capita 10.516 10.512 -0.004 10.476 10.473 -0.003** 
Personal Income Per Capita Growth 3.692 3.711 0.019 3.663 3.682 0.019 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Distance between primary and nonprimary firms 
  Mean 25% 50% 75% St. Dev. N 
Female 620.274 19.981 254.750 881.992 789.537 217 
Male 610.797 28.669 372.691 907.976 703.156 6,544 
Diff (t-value) 9.477 (0.195)           
 
Panel C: Same industry 
  SIC-4 SIC-3 SIC-2 and related industries SIC-1 N 
Female 3% 7% 12% 32% 217 
Male 4% 6% 14% 38% 6,544 
 
Panel D: Connected by male directors 
  Connected Not connected N 
Female 86% 14% 217 
Male 9% 91% 6,544 
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Appendix B: Chapter 2 
Table B.1: Variable definitions 
Firm and stock level variables 
Mutual fund 
ownership (MFO) 
The percentage of shares outstanding that are held by mutual 
funds. 
PurePlay  The organizational form dummy which equals one if the firm is 
a pure-play firm (operates in one 3-digit SIC industry), and zero 
otherwise.  
Market Cap Market capitalization, defined as the dollar value of equity at the 
end of each quarter. 
Stock Return The monthly return on the firm’s stock at the end of the quarter. 
Dividend Yield The ratio of total dividend payout to stock price. 
Return Volatility The volatility of stock returns is calculated using monthly stock 
returns over the prior twelve months. 
Stock Turnover The quarterly share turnover ratio of the outstanding shares. 
M/B The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to the market value of assets. 
Price The end-of-quarter stock price. 
Firm Age The number of years since the firm first appears in CRSP. 
S&P500 An S&P 500 index membership dummy, which equals one if the 
firm is in the S&P 500 Index, and zero otherwise. 
ROA The net income divided by the total assets. 
Spread The average of the monthly trading spread of the stock in each 
quarter. 
 
Mutual fund level variables 
Pureplayness 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  ∑ (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  , where wj  is the 
portfolio weight of stock j in the fund, and Pureplay is a dummy 
that equals one for pure-play firms, and zero for conglomerates.  
Industry 
Concentration 
Index (ICI) 
We follow Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) to define it as 
the sum of the squared deviations of the value weights for each 
of the 10 different industries held by the mutual fund, Wj,t, 
relative to the industry weights of the total stock market, W� j,t: 
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = ∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑊𝑊�𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡)210𝑗𝑗=1 . 
Fund Size The total net assets (TNA) in millions. 
Fund Turnover The turnover ratio in each quarter. 
Expense The annual expense ratio. 
#Stocks The total number of stocks reported in the quarterly holding file. 
Fund Age The number of years since the fund first appears in CRSP. 
Team A dummy that equals one if a fund is managed by two or more 
managers, and zero otherwise. 
Net Inflow 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) 
Fund Returns Fund’s percentage returns 
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Table B.2: Institutional ownership, hedge fund ownership, and single-segment firms 
Tables in the appendix test whether institutional investors or hedge funds prefer 
pureplay firms. We use the same list of hedge funds used in Aiken, Clifford, Ellis, and 
Huang (2017). Panel A and B repeat Tables 2.2 and 2.3 but use hedge fund ownership 
and other institutional investors’ ownership, respectively. Other institutions are 
institutional investors that are not actively managed mutual funds or hedge funds. Panel 
C and D repeat Panel C of Table 2.4 to test industry expertise and preference for pure-
play firms. Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Organizational form and institutional ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IO other IO other HFO HFO 
PurePlay 0.209 0.662 0.323 0.297 
 (0.370) (1.243) (1.014) (0.991) 
Ln(Mkt cap) 6.909*** 4.547*** 1.801*** 1.257*** 
 (30.78) (14.55) (19.40) (8.107) 
Stock return -3.656*** -0.907 -0.403 -0.256 
 (-4.031) (-1.127) (-1.064) (-0.722) 
Dividend yield 22.49*** 7.754* -15.82*** -18.47*** 
 (4.353) (1.784) (-8.400) (-8.203) 
Return volatility -12.58*** -18.44*** -5.625*** -6.740*** 
 (-5.136) (-7.880) (-4.457) (-5.017) 
M/B  -1.417***  -0.491*** 
  (-10.55)  (-6.901) 
Leverage  7.273***  -0.893 
  (6.363)  (-1.505) 
Ln(Price)  3.527***  1.192*** 
  (8.500)  (5.593) 
Ln(Firm age)  0.561*  0.573*** 
  (1.713)  (2.801) 
S&P 500  -0.443  -6.521*** 
  (-0.442)  (-12.43) 
ROA  -2.036***  -0.600* 
  (-3.084)  (-1.734) 
Stock turnover  0.679***  0.227*** 
  (13.73)  (10.04) 
Spread  -104.9***  -51.65*** 
  (-7.319)  (-5.401) 
     
Observations 99,464 96,991 99,464 96,991 
R-squared 0.433 0.487 0.226 0.277 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table B.2 (continued) 
Panel B: Falsification tests 
  (1) (2) 
 IO other HFO 
   
Actual 0.955 -1.004** 
 (1.337) (-2.384) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 26,331 26,331 
R-squared 0.711 0.538 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
 
Panel C: Industry concentration of other institutional investors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IO Other ICI1 IO Other ICI2 IO Other ICI3 IO Other ICI4 IO Other ICI5 
            
PurePlay 0.938** -0.0728 0.0919 0.0641 0.104 
 (2.213) (-0.780) (0.929) (0.510) (1.037) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 
R-squared 0.542 0.090 0.090 0.053 0.084 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel D: Industry concentration of hedge funds 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 HFO ICI1 HFO ICI2 HFO ICI3 HFO ICI4 HFO ICI5 
           
PurePlay 0.176 -0.0437 0.0743 0.0189 0.0273 
 (0.989) (-0.433) (1.468) (0.395) (0.728) 
 (-3.003) (-6.069) (-5.758) (-6.962) (-6.591) 
      
Observations 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 96,991 
R-squared 0.333 0.113 0.059 0.039 0.057 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix C: Chapter 3 
Table C.1: Variable definitions 
NumPat: Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in year t.  
 
NumCited: Natural logarithm of one plus a firm’s total number of citations received on 
the firm’s patents filed in year t. 
 
CiteWeightPat: Natural logarithm of one plus the number of citation-weighted patents 
based on the total citations received by firm i in year t. Citation-weighted patents are 
calculated as ∑ (1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗/𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)𝑗𝑗 , where 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the number of citations to patent j and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is 
the mean number of citations to patents granted in the same year as patent j. 
 
Generality: One minus the Herfindahl index of the citations received by the patent 
portfolio (patents filed by the firm in the previous five years) in year t based on 
technology classes. 
 
Originality: One minus the Herfindahl index of the citations made by the patent 
portfolio (patents filed by the firm in the previous five years) in year t based on 
technology classes. 
 
Patent Index: This measure is constructed in three steps. First, for each technology class 
k and patent application year t, we compute the median value of the number of awarded 
patents in technology class k with application year t across all firms that were awarded 
at least one patent in technology class k with application year t. Second, we scale the 
number of awarded patents to the acquirer/target firm in technology class k with 
application year t by the corresponding technology class-specific and application year-
specific median value from the first step. Third, for the acquirer/target firm, we sum the 
scaled number of awarded patents from the second step across all technology classes 
and across application years. 
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